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Borrowers Beware: The OCC’s “Madden-fix” Rules 
and Their Shield for Predatory Lenders 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is no secret that the lending market values clarity and stability.1  
As a result, banks and nonbank lenders seek certainty in the application 
of laws and regulations.2  In 2017, the lending market faced a disruption 
in the form of Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC.3   Madden brought to 
the forefront a debate over two facets of the lending world, both of which 
had been fermenting for some time.4  Specifically, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) saw Madden’s holding as an attack 
on two long-held assumptions—the Valid When Made5 and True Lender 
doctrines.6  Through two separate rules, the OCC has attempted to restore 
 
1. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-markets-financial-institutions-and-fiscal-
service/fsoc [https://perma.cc/EZS3-JV7E] (showcasing the role of the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council as one of the many facets of lending market stability and risk-
identification). 
2. See, e.g., Marquette Nat. Bank v. First of Omaha Svc. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 312 (1978) 
(noting that without clarity, banks could never be certain as to the permissibility of their 
actions); see generally Philipp Härle et al., The Future of Bank Risk Management, MCKINSEY 
& CO. (July 2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/risk/our-insights/the-
future-of-bank-risk-management [https://perma.cc/2AY7-2K5R] (analyzing the trends in risk 
management and new potential risks for banks and lenders in the wake of the global financial 
crisis). 
3. Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 237 F. Supp. 3d 130 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (deciding on 
remand from the 2d Cir. Court of Appeals in Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 
246 (2d Cir. 2015)). 
4. See id. For a discussion of the doctrines prior to Madden, see infra-Part II.  
5. The premise of the Valid When Made doctrine is that once an acceptable interest rate is 
created on a loan, then it stays valid and applicable even through subsequent transfers or 
purchases.  This doctrine has long been understood to apply to federal and state-chartered 
banks via interest rate choices of law granted under 12 U.S.C. §§ 85 and 1831d, but the central 
debate is whether these interest rates remain valid when in the hands of a non-bank entity who 
alone could not enjoy the choice of law of either statute. Drew Robertson, Five Years Later: 
Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC’s Limited Impact on the Valid When Made Doctrine, KANE 
RUSSELL COLEMAN LOGAN (Feb. 27, 2020) https://lawofbanking.com/2020/02/27/five-years-
later-madden-v-midland-funding-llcs-limited-impact-on-the-valid-when-made-doctrine/ 
[https://perma.cc/L9C9-65H6] (providing a brief history of the doctrine and viewing it 
alongside the market effects of Madden). 
6. The True Lender doctrine is a creation that works in tandem with the Valid When Made 
doctrine, allowing courts to examine the nature of lending relationships, revealing potential 
predatory lending practices.  This doctrine focuses on relationships where a chartered bank 
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clarity to the lending market by providing its stance on the two 
contentious issues (the “Madden-fix rules”).7  Instead, the only thing that 
is clear about the OCC’s rules is that, in their current form, consumers 
are left powerless and without redress for the harms caused by predatory 
lending practices.8  The OCC should revisit and revise these rules to 
prevent a resurgence in predatory lending.9 
Madden’s core decision rested on the Second Circuit’s belief that 
a non-bank entity could not enjoy the interest rate choice of law granted 
to national or state chartered banks under 12 U.S.C. § 85, the National 
 
offloads a loan to a non-bank entity, a common permissible practice but one that predatory 
lenders have traditionally sought to exploit. The OCC and FDIC Plan to Trample State Laws 
by Gutting the Longstanding “True Lender” Doctrine, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING (Aug. 
10, 2020), https://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/research-
publication/crl-gutting-true-lender-rule-10aug2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/QTS7-QHXS] 
(giving a strong overview of the role of the True Lender doctrine in rooting out predatory 
lenders).  
7. See Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 
85 Fed. Reg.  
33,530 (June 2, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160) (providing the OCC’s 
final Valid When Made Rule); see also National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as 
Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg. 68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (offering the 
OCC’s final True Lender rule). 
8. Prof. Adam J. Levitin has been a vocal critic of the OCC’s Madden-fix approaches.  He 
offers a very convincing set of arguments both about the history of the doctrines and how he 
believes that the OCC and Congress fell short in their responses by opening a gap for 
predatory lenders to exploit.  See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, ‘Madden Fix’ Bills Are a Recipe for 
Predatory Lending, AM. BANKER (Aug. 28, 2017), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/madden-fix-bills-are-a-recipe-for-predatory-
lending [https://perma.cc/KVL5-LGEQ] [hereinafter Levitin: ‘Madden-fix’ bills] (arguing 
that the attempted codification of the Valid When Made doctrine, discussed at infra Part III.A, 
would increase the risk of predatory lending to at-risk consumers); see also See Adam J. 
Levitin, Guess Who’s Supporting Predatory Lending, CREDIT SLIPS (Aug. 9, 2017), 
https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2017/08/guess-whos-supporting-predatory-
lending.html#more [https://perma.cc/V8SV-EQPF] [hereinafter Levitin: Predatory Lending] 
(blaming the Democrat sponsors of the Madden-fix bills for “supporting predatory lending” 
by not accurately accounting for the role of the Valid When Made doctrine); see also Adam 
J. Levitin, Trump Administration Declares Open Season on Consumers for Subprime Lenders, 
CREDIT SLIPS (Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2019/11/trump-
administration-declares-open-season-on-consumers.html [https://perma.cc/7M3A-PBHF] 
[hereinafter Levitin: Trump Administration and Subprime Lenders] (criticizing the Trump 
administration and the OCC’s Madden-fix rules for the potential harm that they could cause 
to subprime lenders). 
9. See infra Part V. 
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Bank Act (“NBA”),10 and its sister statute, 12 U.S.C. § 1831d.11  For over 
forty years these two laws have allowed federal and state banks to issue 
loans based on the interest rates of the state where they are 
headquartered.12  The Valid When Made and True Lender doctrines have 
evolved under these statutes.13  The former assumes that an interest rate 
created by a bank under either statute will “stick with” the loan through 
any subsequent transfers or sales to a non-bank lender (“marketplace 
lenders”).14  Therefore, as per its namesake, the Valid When Made 
doctrine would render the rate “valid” when it was made.15  The True 
Lender doctrine worked as a tool to root out predatory marketplace 
lenders who used the Valid When Made doctrine to circumvent state 
usury laws.16 
 
10. The OCC’s Valid When Made and True Lender rules both cite the NBA as its authority 
for promulgation. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1980).  While the Madden Court discussed the application 
of the National Bank Act as a “preemption” of state usury laws, this Note argues that this 
label is a misnomer.  Instead of working to preempt an inconsistent state law, the NBA 
chooses one state’s usury law (the state of the bank’s headquarters) and declares it superior to 
that of a competing state.  See Marquette Nat. Bank v. First of Omaha Svc. Corp., 439 U.S. 
299, 313 (1978) (showcasing the leading Supreme Court case where the NBA is applied, and 
a bank’s “location” is the state of its headquarters).  
11. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d (1989) (providing the same state usury law selection for state-
chartered banks as the NBA provides for federally-chartered banks).  
12. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1980); 12 U.S.C. § 1831d (1989).  Both statutes were last amended in 
the 1980s and have been applied through a robust body of case law.  See generally Marquette 
Nat. Bank v. First of Omaha Svc. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978) (allowing banks to choose the 
usury law of the state of their headquarters). 
13. See William Atherton, Lisa Ledbeddter & Heith Rodman, Bank Regulators Clarify the 
“Valid When Made”Doctrine, JD SUPRA (Nov. 25, 2019), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/bank-regulators-clarify-the-valid-when-45960/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZDW6-N75L] (“The ‘valid-when-made’ doctrine is a long-standing 
common law doctrine providing that bank loans carrying interest rates that are valid when 
made under applicable federal law remain valid with respect to that rate, regardless of whether 
a bank has subsequently sold or assigned the loan to a third party.”) 
14.  See Robertson, supra note 5 (“The ‘valid-when-made-doctrine’ is an important 
component of usury law. It provides that a loan that has a non-usurious interest rate when it 
is made cannot become usurious if the loan is subsequently transferred to a third party, even 
if the third party is in a different state with different lending laws.”). 
15. See id. (“For example, if a lender charges interest in Wisconsin that is not usurious 
under Wisconsin law, a third party in Texas can buy that loan without having to conform the 
interest rate to Texas’s more conservative interest cap.”). 
16. See Zane Gilmer, True Lender Litigation on the Rise: Recent Litigation and 
Enforcement Actions Challenge Traditional Bank Partnership Model, STINSON (Apr. 2, 
2018), http://dodd-frank.com/2018/04/02/true-lender-litigation-on-the-rise-recent-litigation-
and-enforcement-actions-challenge-traditional-bank-partnership-model/ 
[https://perma.cc/2LGP-YWE6] (tracing some of the most well-known True Lender 
enforcement actions and noting their variation(s) by state). 
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On its face, the Madden-fix rulemaking seemed to provide some 
much needed clarity.17  Admittedly, many marketplace lenders—such as 
financial technology (“fintech”) firms—were left in limbo after 
Madden.18  The OCC sought to provide certainty to these entities, 
allowing them to continue their business practices without the worries of 
conflicting stances on these foundational doctrines.19  However, when 
one looks beyond these surface-level benefits, problems arise.20   
The reality is that the OCC’s Madden-fix is anything but clear.21  
In one fell swoop, the OCC has offered certainty to legitimate businesses 
while inviting predatory lenders to find new footholds in avoiding state 
usury laws.22  Now, inquiries into suspect lending relationships are told 
 
17. See Brandon Curtin et al., OCC Issues Final Rule Clarifying the “Valid When Made” 
Doctrine, JD SUPRA (June 5, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/occ-issues-final-
rule-clarifying-the-77170/ [https://perma.cc/Q85U-VU44] (“The [Valid When Made] Rule 
fills the gap by providing that the interest rate is unaffected by the assignment of a loan 
contract.”); see also Angela Rankins, OCC Issues Final “True Lender” Rule, JD SUPRA, 
(Nov. 4, 2020) https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/occ-issues-final-true-lender-rule-68235/ 
[https://perma.cc/7N94-TWPM] (“Further, Acting Comptroller Brian Brooks recently said in 
a statement that the Final [True Lender] Rule ‘clarifies that banks retain compliance 
obligations for loans they originate.’”). 
18. See Benjamin Lo, Online Lenders Shouldn't Get Mad Over Madden, 10 J. BUS. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 63, 71–74 (2016) (critiquing Madden and suggesting changes that 
financial technology companies should make to limit their exposure but also cautioning 
against hasty overhauls of business models). 
19. See Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 
85 Fed. Reg. 33,532 (June 2, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160) (“[T]o 
effectively assign a loan contract and allow the assignee to step into the shoes of the national 
bank assignor, a permissible interest term must remain permissible and enforceable 
notwithstanding the assignment.”). 
20. Commentators who oppose the Madden-fix have offered a whole myriad of issues and 
problems which they perceive to be plaguing the rules. Ranging from potential violations of 
the Dodd-Frank Act and the Administrative Procedure Act, to more practical concerns on 
future lending, the comment letter from the Center for Responsible Lending, et al., provides 
a comprehensive summary of all these arguments. See Center For Responsible Lending, 
Comment Letter to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, at 38 (Sept. 3, 2020) 
https://consumerfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/OCC-True-Lender-
Comment_Sept3_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/TY8U-PXSV] [hereinafter CRL Comment 
Letter] (arguing that the practical impacts of these rules will severely damage lending to small 
businesses and consumers). 
21. See Matthew J. Razzano, A Better Madden Fix: Holistic Reform Not Band-Aids, to 
Modernize Banking Law, 54 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM CAVEAT BLOG POST (July 3, 2020) 
https://mjlr.org/2020/07/03/a-better-madden-fix-holistic-reform-not-band-aids-to-
modernize-banking-law// [https://perma.cc/EH24-8KHM] (arguing that the OCC’s current 
approach to fixing Madden simply acts as a patch and ignores the “deeper systemic issues at 
the heart of Madden”). 
22. See Levitin: Predatory Lending, supra note 8 (“Usury laws represent judgments by 
state legislatures about rates at which borrowing is presumptively too risky. If Congress wants 
to preempt those usury laws, that’s one thing, but it’s outrageous to allow national banks to 
launder usurious loans for predatory lenders.”). 
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to cease upon discovery of a loan’s originating entity, granting predatory 
lenders carte blanche to operate in the shadows of a bank’s charter.23  The 
combination of these rules has the potential to do more harm to the 
lending market than Madden ever could have.24  Therefore, the OCC 
should revise its Madden-fix rules to preclude certain lending 
relationships by forcing banks to take the initial risk of their loans while 
allowing states to retain more flexibility in enforcing consumer protection 
and usury laws.25  Without such a change, states and consumers will be 
left powerless and unprotected from predatory lenders.26 
This note proceeds in six parts.  Part II briefly analyzes the facts 
of Madden and discusses where the Second Circuit went wrong in its 
interpretation of the NBA.  Part III reviews the lending world and the 
Valid When Made and True Lender doctrines pre-Madden, highlighting 
just how significant the OCC’s Madden-fix rules truly are.  Part IV looks 
at the rules themselves, bifurcating the positive impacts which should be 
preserved from the negatives which must be addressed.  Part V offers 
several potential solutions for the OCC to consider in revisiting its 
Madden-fix rules.  
 
23. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC Should Withdraw its Proposed “True Lender” 
Rule, THE FIN REG BLOG (Aug. 31, 2020) 
https://sites.law.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2020/08/31/the-occ-should-withdraw-its-proposed-
true-lender-rule/#_ftn1 [https://perma.cc/2RTS-RDQK] (“The proposed rule would allow a 
national bank or federal thrift to act as a mere conduit by quickly transferring loans to its 
nonbank ‘partner,’ which could assume all of the economic risks and control the terms and 
enforcement of the loans.”). 
24. Much of this Note is premised on the argument that Madden’s market impact was quite 
negligible in terms of affecting the Valid When Made and True Lender doctrines. However, 
the OCC’s Madden-fix rules have the potential for a much more worrisome impact on the 
market and on consumer protection. See Charles M. Horn & Melissa R. H. Hall, The Curious 
Case of Madden v. Midland Funding and the Survival of the Valid-When-Made Doctrine, 21 
N.C. BANKING INST. 1, 22 (2017); see also Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 23 (observing that after 
the “anxiety and disruption” of Madden’s ruling passed, the marketplace was able to adjust to 
the holding). 
25. See infra Part V. 
26. See Press Release, NCLC, OCC Proposal Would Turn State Interest Rate Limits Into 
a “Dead Letter,” Causing Explosion of Rent-a-Bank Payday Lending That Will Devastate 
Struggling Families (July 20, 2020), https://www.nclc.org/media-center/occ-proposal-would-
turn-state-interest-rate-limits-into-a-dead-letter-causing-explosion-of-rent-a-bank-payday-
lending-that-will-devastate-struggling-families.html [https://perma.cc/9CXD-EL8M] 
[hereinafter NCLC Press Release] (claiming that the OCC’s   Madden-fix rules will render 
states without power to protect at-risk consumers, especially in the context of the COVID-19 
pandemic). 
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II.  MADDEN AND ITS EFFECTS 
The premise of Madden was relatively simple.  Saliha Madden 
owed $5,000 on her credit card bill to Bank of America (“BoA”), a 
nationally chartered bank.27  The debt between Ms. Madden and BoA was 
set at an interest rate of 27%, a rate higher than the allowable 25% in Ms. 
Madden’s home state of New York.28  As per the interest rate choice of 
law granted to BoA under the NBA,29 BoA could charge Ms. Madden the 
interest rate of the state where the bank is headquartered.30 
Subsequently, BoA transferred Ms. Madden’s debt to its newly 
consolidated credit card service, FIA Card Services, N.A. (“FIA”).31  
After determining that Ms. Madden’s debt was “uncollectable,” FIA sold 
her debt to a purchaser, Midland Funding, LLC  (“Midland”).32  At this 
point, as the court in Madden emphasized, neither BoA nor FIA held any 
interest in Ms. Madden’s debt.33  Ms. Madden then challenged Midland’s 
 
27. See generally Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 237 F. Supp. 3d 130 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) 
(deciding, on remand from the Second Circuit, that New York usury laws prevented Midland 
Funding from collecting Madden’s debt at its 27% rate). 
28. See Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 248 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(“Accordingly, because FIA is incorporated in Delaware, which permits banks to charge 
interest rates that would be usurious under New York law, FIA's collection at those rates in 
New York does not violate the NBA and is not subject to New York's stricter usury laws, 
which the NBA preempts.”). 
29. See Bank of Am., Bank of America FAQ’s,  
https://www.bankofamerica.com/help/facts/ [https://perma.cc/LRC5-4PKD] (last visited 
Dec. 9, 2020) (stating that BoA’s corporate address is 100 North Tryon Street, Charlotte, NC 
28255). 
30. See BANK OF AM. CO., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 2015) (showing BoA’s 
headquarters as North Carolina and its place of incorporation as Delaware). 
31. To understand this transaction, it must be clear which entities came to have ownership 
over Ms. Madden’s debt and how. In 2006 Bank of America acquired a large cardholder 
association, the Maryland Bank National Association (“MBNA”). Within the same year, 
MBNA was acquired by another banking group known as Lloyd’s Banking Group. However, 
while it was held by Bank of America, MBNA was consolidated into FIA, the entity which 
eventually sold Ms. Madden’s debt to Midland Funding, LLC. See Madden v. Midland 
Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 248 (2d Cir. 2015) (giving the procedural background and 
history of Ms. Madden’s debt and its passing through various entities, ending with Midland 
Funding, LLC); see also Christina Majaski, What is FIA Credit Card Services, CARDS MIX, 
(Feb. 17, 2017) https://cardsmix-usa-avqfktzllevohwsax.netdna-ssl.com/fia-credit-card-
services [https://perma.cc/ZG7L-XM83] (tracing the history and transformation of FIA Card 
Services). 
32. See Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 248 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Madden 
owed approximately $5,000 on her credit card account and in 2008, FIA ‘charged-off’ her 
account . . . . FIA then sold Madden's debt to Defendant–Appellee Midland Funding, LLC [ ] 
a debt purchaser.”).  
33. See id. (“Upon Midland Funding’s acquisition of Madden’s debt, neither FIA nor BoA 
possessed any further interest in the account.”). 
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ability to charge her the 27% interest rate set by BoA.34  Midland was 
neither a national nor a state-chartered bank, and such a rate—absent an 
applicable choice of usury law provision—was clearly more than the 
maximum interest allowed under New York usury laws.35  
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Ms. Madden.36  
In reversing the district court’s holding, the Second Circuit pointed to the 
fact that “neither defendant is a national bank nor a subsidiary of a 
national bank,” as its reasoning for withholding NBA interest-rate choice 
of law from Midland.37  In sum, the Second Circuit looked solely at the 
NBA and the fact that Midland was not a nationally chartered bank.38  
From there, it concluded that the NBA’s choice of state usury laws was 
not applicable to such a secondary loan purchaser.39  Once the loan left 
the hands of a chartered bank, the Second Circuit believed that the loan 
lost the ability to charge the customer based on a different state’s interest 
rate.40 
A.         Where the Madden-Court Went Wrong 
The first major problem with Madden’s holding was that the 
Second Circuit seemed to ignore the existence of the Valid When Made 
and True Lender doctrines.41  In fact, the case makes no mention of either 
doctrine.42  Because of the ruling’s implicit potential effect on the 
 
34. See id. (offering the background on Ms. Madden’s subsequent class action against 
Midland, along with her central claims). 
35. See id. at 249 (“Because neither defendant is a national bank nor a subsidiary or agent 
of a national bank or is otherwise acting on behalf of a national bank, . . . . we reverse the 
District Court's holding that the NBA preempts Madden's claims and accordingly vacate the 
judgment of the District Court.”). 
36. Id.  
37. See id. at 247–49 (providing the Second Circuit’s guiding reason as to why it declined 
to apply the NBA to the debt held by Midland). 
38. See id.  at 248 (defining a nationally chartered bank). 
39. See id. at 249–50 (showcasing the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the NBA as 
applying to banks and certain agents/extensions of banks but declining to extend its coverage 
to an entity such as Midland Funding). 
40. See id. at 250 (“The defendants argue that, as assignees of a national bank, they too are 
allowed under the NBA to charge interest at the rate permitted by the state where the assignor 
national bank is located . . . . [w]e disagree.”). 
41. See id. at 249–50 (offering an entire section of the Madden opinion, dedicated to 
discussing the NBA as “preemption”); see also  Horn & Hall, supra note 24, at 27–28 
(“Because the valid-when-made doctrine was not an issue that had been brought before the 
District Court, its decision made no mention of the doctrine, nor did the decision address any 
substantive issues regarding the nature and extent of national bank preemption in the loan 
transfer context.”). 
42. See generally Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015). 
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viability and application of the doctrines, many observers read in-
between the lines of the holding.43  Some commentators, including the 
OCC, saw this holding as a challenge to the very existence of both 
doctrines.44  The OCC acknowledged the disruption caused by Madden, 
nodding to it as the necessary cause for promulgating its final Valid When 
Made rule.45  The OCC then cited the “ambiguity” and silence of the NBA 
as its basis for issuing the rules.46  In contrast to this broad interpretation, 
other commentators advocated for reading Madden narrowly since it 
ignored any discussion of these two doctrines.47   Some even argued that 
Madden may have been decided on a misunderstanding of the law and 
should be overturned.48  
This led to the second problem with Madden’s holding—the 
Second Circuit appears to have misinterpreted the NBA along with 
Section 1831d, and their respective interest rate provisions.49  Indeed, 
 
43. See Michael Cumming et al., OCC Madden Rule Is First Step Toward Needed Clarity 
for Banks Fintechs and Nonbank Lenders, JD SUPRA (June 5, 2020), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/occ-madden-rule-is-first-step-toward-11851/ 
[https://perma.cc/N8J8-E9CQ] (“Although the court did not directly address the ‘valid when 
made’ doctrine, many viewed the decision as an assault on that doctrine, stating 
that Madden undercut settled expectations that interest rates, valid at origination, would 
continue to be enforceable following a bank’s sale of the loan.”). 
44. See, e.g., Jeremy T. Rosenblum, OCC and FDIC Issue Proposed Rules to Undo 
Madden, CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR, (Nov. 21, 2019), 
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2019/11/21/occ-and-fdic-issue-proposed-rules-
to-undo-madden/ [https://perma.cc/R4PU-4B4T] (tracing the aftermath of Madden and the 
uncertainty that it caused to the two doctrines). 
45. See Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 
85 Fed. Reg. 33,530 (June 2, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160) (“Despite these 
authorities, recent developments have created legal uncertainty about the ongoing 
permissibility of the interest term after a bank transfers a loan.”). 
46. See id. at 3352 (claiming that the “ambiguity created by the silence in section 85 
(NBA)” was highlighted and drove the OCC’s authority to promulgate this rule). 
47. See id. at 33,531 (citing Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1966) as an 
example of the courts deferring to the OCC’s ability to interpret “ambiguity” within the 
NBA); but see National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders,  85 Fed. Reg. 
68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (arguing that the NBA is not 
interpreting the NBA with its “True Lender” rule but nevertheless reaffirming its authority to 
do so in the face of “ambiguity,” again citing Smiley v. Citibank). 
48. See Horn & Hall, supra note 24, at 1–2 (“The outcome of the Madden decision involves 
a somewhat specific interaction of usury and federal preemption principles, discussed below, 
that may not necessarily be broadly replicated in many types of commercial and consumer 
loan transactions.”). 
49. See id. at 9–10 (discussing how the practice of interest rate exportation and the 
applicable law(s) “do not require or impose a separate federal interest rate,” which is the core 
of preemption and the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, but instead allow covered 
institutions to “rely on a single state interest rate” throughout all its lending practices) 
(emphasis added). 
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both the Second Circuit and the OCC referred to the NBA’s choice of 
interest rate law as a “preemption.”50  This interpretation was not only 
erroneous,51 but it likely led to the Court’s failure to account for the 
interplay of the Valid When Made and True Lender doctrines with the 
matter in front of it.52  As has been recognized in much of the post-
Madden literature, the NBA, and Section 1831d commentary, true 
preemption is when a federal and state law conflict over the same 
matter.53  In such instances, the federal law will either explicitly preempt 
the state law, or it will impliedly prevail via the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution.54  
Contrasting this definition with the NBA and Section 1831d 
interest rate provisions, it is clear that they function more as a federal 
choice of state law.55  Unlike a competition between federal and state law, 
both provisions allow a bank to choose the applicable usury law of the 
 
50. See Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 
85 Fed. Reg. 33,531–33 (June 2, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160) (declining 
to make a definitive determination on the NBA’s potential preemptive characteristics but 
recognizing the debate); see also National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as 
Lenders,  85 Fed. Reg. 68,743 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (discussing 
the potential impact(s) should non-bank lenders be given the “benefits of federal preemption” 
without being subject to the OCC’s oversight). 
51. See Federal Preemption, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The principle 
(derived from the Supremacy Clause) that a federal law can supersede or supplant any 
inconsistent state law or regulation.”). 
52. See Horn & Hall, supra note 24, at 2 (“[W]e conclude that Madden was wrongly 
decided due to a misplaced primary focus by the defendants on federal bank preemption 
principles, causing the Second Circuit to all but ignore the valid-when-made doctrine.”). 
53. See Horn & Hall, supra note 24, at 9–10 (“This interest rate exportation authority, 
however, is often discussed as deriving from principles of federal preemption, a notion that is 
only partially accurate. In fact, the interest rate exportation authority in Section 85 and Section 
27 (collectively, the ‘Exportation Provisions’) constitutes federal ‘preemption’ only in the 
sense that it allows an insured depository institution to rely on its home state usury law in 
setting the rate(s) of interest for loans to customers in other states rather than the usury law of 
the customer’s state of residence. In other words, the interest rate Exportation Provisions do 
not require or impose a separate federal interest rate, but instead allow a depository institution 
to rely on a single state interest rate.”).  
54. See id. at 8 (“The fundamental legal basis of federal preemption in the national bank 
context is that because national banks are organized under and derive their powers from 
federal law, it is federal, and not state, law that principally governs their activities and 
operations. The principle of preemption is grounded in the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution . . . .”).  
55. See id. at 9 (tracing the Congressional response to an expansive use and interpretation 
of state law preemption powers by the OCC and showing how Congress subsequently limited 
these abilities in 2008 with Dodd-Frank). 
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state of its headquarters.56  In situations such as Madden, there are no 
competing federal and state interest rate laws when applying either the 
NBA or Section 1831d.57  Due to the Second Circuit’s insistence on 
referring to the situation as “interest rate preemption,” the Court failed to 
account for how the NBA should be applied alongside the Valid When 
Made and True Lender doctrines.58 
Madden’s holding was so shocking to those in the lending 
industry that the Second Circuit actually became the subject of case 
studies in an attempt to measure its impact on consumer lending.59  While 
some analyzed the actual effects of Madden on the secondary lending 
market,60 others claimed that the Second Circuit made an erroneous 
ruling, and its impact should be limited.61  Because of this debate around 
what exactly Madden meant to the Valid When Made and True Lender 
doctrines, many commentators called upon the OCC to respond.62  And 
that is exactly what the OCC did.63 
 
56. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001 (2016) (applying 12 U.S.C. § 85 and exhibiting a clear 
ability for national banks to choose the application of state usury laws based upon the place 
of their headquarters). 
57. In Madden, the Second Circuit was arguably swayed not by a competing federal usury 
law, but by the framing of the case as a “preemption” matter versus a “valid when made” 
matter. For a more thorough discussion on this view, see Horn & Hall, supra note 24, at 20–
21 (tracing the different outcomes of Madden depending on how one frames the issues). 
58. See id. at 17 (“What is particularly curious about the Madden decision is its singular 
focus on the application of National Bank Act preemption to the nonbank defendants without 
also taking into account the valid -when-made principle.”). 
59. See Colleen Honigsberg et al., How Does Legal Enforceability Affect Consumer 
Lending? Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 60 THE J. OF LAB. & ECON. 673, 673 (2017) 
(studying the impact of Madden on low-credit borrowers and concluding that it “reduced 
credit availability for higher-risk borrowers in affected states.”). 
60. See id. (analyzing what appeared to be a decrease in loan capital/access for subprime 
consumers in the Second Circuit post-Madden); see also Permissible Interest on Loans That 
Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 85 Fed. Reg. 33,530 (June 2, 2020) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160) (“Two commenters provided empirical studies analyzing 
the effects of the Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC decision, including evidence that Madden 
restricted access to credit for higher-risk borrowers in states within the Second Circuit and 
that it caused a rise in personal bankruptcies due to a decline in marketplace lending, 
especially for low-income households.”). 
61. See Robertson, supra note 5 (tracing the aftermath of Madden and how the market has 
responded). 
62. See National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders,  85 Fed. Reg. 68,742 
(Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7); see also Permissible Interest on Loans That 
Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 85 Fed. Reg. 33530 (June 2, 2020) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160) (stating the sheer volume of comments that the OCC has 
received in response to its proposed true lender and valid when made rules). 
63. See generally National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders,  85 Fed. 
Reg. 68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7); see also Permissible Interest 
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III. THE LENDING WORLD PRE-MADDEN 
To properly understand the impact of the Madden-fix rules, it is 
necessary to view them through the scope of how the lending market 
operated prior to the case.64  This analysis focuses on the Valid When 
Made and True Lender doctrines before the OCC’s Madden-fix rules, 
along with how federal choice of interest rate law comes into play.65 
 
A.         The Valid When Made Doctrine 
 
The Valid When Made doctrine has arguably existed in various 
functions and forms for well over 100 years.66  At its core, the doctrine 
states that an interest rate, which is non-usurious at its inception, does not 
become usurious upon subsequent assignment or transfer of the loan.67  
The Supreme Court first dealt with this concept in 1833 in the 
case Nichols v. Fearson.68  Although it was not concerned with bank 
loans, Fearson dealt with the validity of a promissory note’s interest rate 
and its interplay with state usury laws.69  While it never explicitly named 
the doctrine, the Court in Fearson recognized that a contract that is non-
usurious at its point of creation cannot later be invalidated by a usurious 
 
on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 85 Fed. Reg. 33,530 (June 2, 
2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160). 
64. For good discussions of how the lending market operated prior to Madden, along with 
analyses of its impact, see generally Lo, supra note 18, at 65–67 (discussing the role of the 
NBA in lending relationships, how it applied along with the OCC’s regulatory authority over 
certain lending relationships, and how Madden was likely a misinterpretation of the NBA as 
a “preemption” versus a choice of law statute). 
65. See infra Part III.A–D.  
66. See, e.g., Nichols v. Fearson, 32 U.S. 103 (1833) (providing the first observable 
instance of the concept of interest rates remaining valid upon transfer).  But see Brief of 
Professor Adam J. Levitin as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant, In re: Rent-Rite 
SuperKegs W. Ltd., 484 B.R. 1  (Bankr. D. Colo. R., 2012) (No. 1:19-cv-01552-REB) 
[hereinafter Brief of Prof. Adam J. Levitin as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant] (arguing 
that the Valid When Made doctrine is not as old as people assume it to be and is rather based 
off a misunderstanding of older law). 
67. See Diego Zuluaga, Invalid When Made: The District Court’s Madden v. Midland 
Decision, CATO INST. (Mar. 20, 2018, 9:21 AM), https://www.cato.org/blog/invalid-when-
made-district-courts-madden-v-midland-decision [https://perma.cc/3PXF-K2UU] 
(discussing the Valid When Made doctrine and Madden’s impact(s) on it). 
68. Nichols v. Fearson, 32 U.S. 103, 109–10 (1833) (examining the potential for a 
promissory note’s interest rate to continue despite transfer of the note post-execution). 
69. See id. at 103–04 (outlining the background of the case, which involved the transfer of 
a promissory note and its interplay with applicable usury laws of the time). 
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transaction.70  As such, Fearson was likely the beginning of the Valid 
When Made doctrine in the United States.71  
In 1978 the Supreme Court dealt directly with the NBA—12 
U.S.C. § 85—and its deference to state usury laws of the location of a 
national bank’s headquarter.72  In Marquette Nat. Bank v. First of Omaha 
Svc. Corp., the Court held that a national bank is located where it is 
headquartered and thus may export that state’s interest rate limits to 
borrowers located in other states, even if those limits are in excess of 
permissible rate(s) in the borrower’s own state.73  In function, the Court 
saw the NBA as a permissive grant for a federally chartered bank to 
choose the usury laws of its state of headquarters and apply it to loans 
across the country.74  However, the Court only analyzed this choice of 
law through the lens of the federally regulated bank and its out-of-state 
customers but not that of any subsequent transferees of the loan.75  While 
the Court recognized the potential for impairment of the usury laws in the 
borrower’s state, it claimed that such was the nature of the NBA’s 
intent.76 
Post-Marquette, national banks largely enjoyed the ability to 
choose the usury laws of the state of its headquarters.77  However, prior 
to 1980, state banks had no such choice of law privilege and were limited 
by their state’s usury laws and a lack of parity with banks covered by the 
 
70. See id. at 103 (“[A] contract which in its inception is unaffected by usury can never be 
invalidated by any subsequent usurious transaction.”). 
71. See, e.g., Atherton et al., supra note 13 (citing Fearson as the first example of the “long-
standing common law doctrine” of Valid When Made). 
72. See Marquette Nat. Bank v. First of Omaha Svc. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978) (applying 
the NBA’s choice of law to state usury laws amidst the rise of consumer credit in the 1970’s 
and rejecting a preemption argument). 
73. Marquette Nat. Bank v. First of Omaha Svc. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 310 (1978) (“The 
congressional debates surrounding the enactment of § 30 [the original version of 12 U.S.C. § 
85] were conducted on the assumption that a national bank was ‘located’ for purposes of the 
section in the State named in its organization certificate.”).  
74. See id. (“Omaha bank cannot be deprived of this location merely because it is extending 
credit to residents of a foreign State.”). 
75. See id. at 312–13 (discussing that the “mere fact” of a bank’s enrollment of a state’s 
citizens into loans “does not suffice” to locate the bank in that state for the purposes of usury 
law limitations). 
76. See id. at 318 (“This impairment, however, has always been implicit in the structure of 
the National Bank Act, since citizens of one State were free to visit a neighboring Stat to 
receive credit at foreign interest rates.”). 
77. See Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, The Public Option in Housing Finance, 46 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1111, 1164 (2013) (examining the impact of Marquette specifically on 
the housing finance market, but also discussing its overall effects on interest rate and usury 
laws throughout the states). 
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NBA.78  In 1980, Congress passed 12 U.S.C. § 1831d.79  Acting as a 
complement to the NBA, Section 1831d provided a similar privilege for 
state-chartered banks, allowing them to choose and enjoy the rates of the 
state of their location.80  Together, these acts created a robust system of 
banks originating loans and subsequently offloading them to entities 
across the country.81  
The Valid When Made doctrine impliedly arose in this context.82  
After cases such as Fearson and Marquette, lenders assumed that once a 
loan was created by a national or state bank, it carried its interest rate with 
it through any subsequent sales or transformations.83  This allowed the 
doctrine to grow in both its prevalence and in the reliance that lenders 
placed upon it.84  Although it was widely utilized, the Valid When Made 
doctrine never appeared in anything more than an implied assumption or 
relatively dated judicial opinions recognizing it.85  Congress did attempt 
to codify the doctrine in 2017.86  However, the contentious bill87 never 
 
78. See, e.g., John J. Schroeder, “Duel” Banking System? State Bank Parity Laws: An 
Examination of Regulatory Practice, Constitutional Issues, and Philosophical Questions, 36 
INDIANA L. REV. 197, 202 (2003) (tracing parity laws in all the states that have them and 
examining how they affect state bank action(s)). 
79. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831d (1980) (showing the same concept(s) as the NBA in terms of 
interest rate choice of law, except applicable to state-chartered banks). 
80. See id. (mimicking the NBA’s choice of usury law provisions as applied to state-
chartered banks). 
81. See Steven M. Kaplan et al., Review Course on Interest Rate Exportation, K&L GATES 
*at 2–5 (2011) https://files.klgates.com/files/upload/interest_exportation_webinar.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BL4Y-JFBV] (providing an overview of the various statutes, including the 
NBA and § 1831d which allow for the practice of interest rate exportation). 
82. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Lattimore Land Corp., 656 F.2d 139, 148–49 (5th 
Cir. 1981) (“The non-usurious character of a note should not change when the note changes 
hands.”) (providing an example of the Valid When Made doctrine in action).  
83. See Valid-When-Made Doctrine Overview, STRUCTURED FIN. ASS’N * at 2 (Aug. 2019) 
https://structuredfinance.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Valid-When-Made_Structured-
Finance-Association.pdf  [https://perma.cc/4UQQ-QV97] (tracing the reliance that lenders 
placed on the doctrine and the negative impact(s) that they predict will be seen if the doctrine 
ceases to exist). 
84. See Horn & Hall, supra note 24, at 7 (“Certainly, as a business matter, the valid-when-
made principle has been universally relied on in the lending business, inasmuch as the ability 
of a loan transferee to rely upon the enforceability and collectability in full of a loan that is 
validly made is central to the stability and liquidity of the domestic loan markets, to say 
nothing of core principles of commercial dealing.”). 
85. See id. at 7 n.29–30 (noting examples of case law that recognized the Valid When Made 
doctrine but also noting their relative age and lack of recent developments). 
86. See Protecting Consumers’ Access to Credit Act of 2017, H.R. Res. 3299, 115th Cong. 
§ 2(2)(3) (2018) (as referred to S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Feb. 15, 
2018) (offering the only attempt at codifying the Valid When Made doctrine). 
87. See Levitin: ‘Madden-fix’ Bills, supra note 8 (arguing that the bill is based upon a 
“faulty reading of case law”). 
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became law.88  Congress’ failure to codify the Valid When Made doctrine 
makes the OCC’s Madden-fix rules that much more impactful,89 
potentially leaving it open to reversal.90 
B.         The Valid When Made Doctrine in Action  
As Marquette and its progeny developed and attempts at 
codification failed, complaints that courts and Congress largely 
misunderstood the proper application of the Valid When Made doctrine 
arose.91  Like many of those complaints, the Madden court may very well 
have underestimated the reach of its holding beyond third-party loan 
purchasers.92  In particular, the Madden court did little to look beyond its 
holding and the potential impacts it might have on marketplace lenders, 
including the rise of fintechs and their business models.93  
Known colloquially as “marketplace lending,” many lending 
businesses are predicated on an ability to assume non-usurious loans and 
 
88. See H.R. Res. 3299, 115th Cong. § 2(2)(3) (2018) (as referred to S. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, Feb. 15, 2018) (showing that the bill never made it out of its 
Senate subcommittee and is therefore null). 
89. There is a tenable argument that the OCC’s codification of the Madden-fix rules in fact 
violate the non-delegation doctrine. See John Hannon, The True Lender Doctrine: Function 
over Form as a Reasonable Constraint on the Exportation of Interest Rates, 67 DUKE L.J. 
1261, 1289  (2018). For the purposes of this Note, it is enough to recognize that Congress’s 
failure to pass any bill related to the doctrines may evince a lack of consensus by legislators 
on how to address the problem. Id. at 1290 n.161 (“Congress could, of course, codify the basic 
principles of the [T]rue [L]ender doctrine. But the fact-bound application of such a statute is 
certain to rest, at some level of review, with the courts—where the doctrine already exists.”). 
90. This Note mentions the possibility that the Congressional Review Act (“CRA”) could 
potentially come into play for reversing either of the two Madden-fix rule, however this seems 
unlikely. See infra Part V. 
91. See, e.g., Brief of Prof. Adam J. Levitin as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant, supra 
note 66, at 35 (concluding that the Valid When Made doctrine is a work of fiction and not a 
facet of common law). 
92. See Hannon, supra note 89, at 1277 (“Several facets of the Madden opinion suggest 
that the court was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to withhold the benefits of the 
exportation doctrine from nonbank entities.”). 
93. See Peter Conti-Brown, Can Fintech Increase Lending? How Courts Are Undermining 
Financial Inclusion, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 16, 2019), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/can-fintech-increase-lending-how-courts-are-
undermining-financial-inclusion/ [https://perma.cc/DDY5-Z6E4] (“The Madden court 
reached the conclusion but without much relevant explanation: so long as the defendants 
weren’t agents of national banks (or national banks themselves), then the national law does 
not apply. Or, as the Court concluded with its awkward syntax, those institutions ‘acted solely 
on their own behalves, as owners of the debt.’”). 
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interest rates from national and state banks.94  Marketplace lenders have 
long relied on the assumption of the Valid When Made doctrine in 
conducting their businesses.95  These companies can even be in the 
business of soliciting lending relationships with consumers while 
simultaneously transacting with banks to originate and immediately 
offload the loan to the marketplace lender themselves.96  For example, 
Sindeo, a fintech platform, provides low-interest and easily accessible 
first-time home loans as well as quick refinancing options to consumers, 
relying on the ability to work with banks to originate and sell off 
mortgages.97  Companies such as these can offer convenient new 
elements and access to the lending market for both consumers and banks, 
but they often exist because of these lending arrangements with state and 
national banks.98  Alone, a company like Sindeo could not use the 
statutory choices of either the NBA or Section 1831d to choose an interest 
rate for its loan, and instead is subject to each state’s usury laws.99 
In what has been characterized as a “win-win-win” scenario,100 
fintechs can also provide banks with technology that is much more adept 
 
94. See id. (“[F]intech is also helpful in permitting new specializations to grow within the 
financial system such that not everyone must go to the banking juggernauts . . . for every 
financial service.”); see also Christopher K. Odinet, Securitizing Digital Debts, 52 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 477, 527–34 (2020) (discussing the pros and cons of the rise of financial technology 
companies and online lending). 
95. See id. at 532–34 (analyzing the role of the Valid When Made and True Lender 
doctrines alongside fintech lending relationships and marketplace lending models). 
96. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. COMM’N, SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS, MARKETPLACE LENDING 
(Winter 2015) at 13 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/siwin15/SI_Winter2015
.pdf [https://perma.cc/NC7L-Z2JJ] [hereinafter FDIC: Marketplace Lending] (providing a 
thorough explanation of common forms of marketplace lending and bank-secondary lender 
partnerships). 
97. Known collectively as the “Freedom Financial Network,” this collection of Fintechs, 
including Sindeo, provide services ranging from mortgage calculators, to full debt-
restructuring programs. Many of these rely on the interplay of bank interest rate choice of law 
and the ability for the companies to assume various customers’ loans. See Our Companies, 
FREEDOM FIN. NETWORK https://www.freedomfinancialnetwork.com/our_companies 
[https://perma.cc/442S-6L4L] (last visited Jan. 29, 2021) (offering examples of a wide range 
of debt and lending services from Sindeo’s parent company, Freedom Financial Network). 
98. See Artur Bachynskyi, Top-11 US Lending Startups That are Disrupting the Real 
Estate Industry, DJANGOSTARS (2020), https://djangostars.com/blog/lending-fintech-startups/ 
[https://perma.cc/932Y-LTXG] (claiming that the rise in Fintech lending services will only 
continue to grow). 
99. Neither Sindeo nor Freedom Financial Network is a national or state-chartered-bank, 
nor are they an agent of one. Therefore, the NBA and section 1831d would not apply to them. 
12 U.S.C. § 85 (1980); 12 U.S.C. § 1831d (1989). 
100. See Zac Robinson, True Integrated Receivables—A Win-Win-Win for Banks, 
Corporate Customers and FinTechs, FTNI, https://www.ftni.com/blog/true-integrated-
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at dealing with small-dollar lending while banks can originate and offload 
loans to them.101  In fact, San Francisco-based fintech Aura received a 
$10 million investment to expand its offerings of small-dollar lending 
services and to increase its partnership(s) with banks.102  Companies such 
as Aura generally operate in what is often referred to as a “bank 
partnership model.”103  In the typical bank partnership model, a 
marketplace lender, such as FIA Card Services in Ms. Madden’s case,104 
might act as an intermediary to facilitate a loan, referring it to a chartered 
financial institution to make with its choice of interest rate.105  While the 
financial institution is the one who generally disburses the funds to the 
borrower, it will almost immediately sell the loan to the marketplace 
lender.106  That marketplace lender might also receive some fee or 
incentive from the bank if they somehow helped originate the loan.107  
 
receivables-a-win-win-win-for-banks-corporate-customers-and-fintechs 
[https://perma.cc/8625-VN5E] (outlining the benefits for all parties when technology is added 
to ease and promote lending) (last visited Sept. 22, 2020). 
101. See Mary Jackson, There’s a Better Way to Regulate Small-Dollar Lending, AM. 
BANKER (Dec. 4, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/theres-a-better-
way-to-regulate-small-dollar-lending [https://perma.cc/FC9F-ZAQW] (arguing that 
Congress should focus on passing bills to promote bank-fintech partnerships). 
102. See Will Hernandez, Small-Dollar Lending Fintech Attracts Prudential Backing, AM. 
BANKER (June 25, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/small-dollar-lending-
fintech-attracts-prudential-backing [https://perma.cc/3AAA-6XEF] (offering an example of a 
fast-growing Fintech and tracing its marketplace impact). 
103. A very comprehensive analysis of the typical “bank partnership model” can be found 
from FDIC: Marketplace Lending, supra note 96, at 13–18 (offering a flowchart of how these 
lending relationships typically function, followed by a discussion of their role in the market). 
104. It is important to note that, while FIA Card Services was a chartered institution, not 
all marketplace lenders are. See Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 248 (2d 
Cir. 2015) (noting that FIA card services or “FIA Card Services N.A.” is a National 
Association—a form of federal charter granted by the OCC). But see, e.g., Marc Franson & 
Peter Manbeck, The Regulation of Marketplace Lending: A Summary of the Principal Issues, 
Chapman at *25 (Apr. 2019) 
https://www.chapman.com/media/publication/926_Chapman_Regulation_of_Marketplace_
Lending_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/86GK-WSVM] (exploring ways that the OCC has 
sought to regulate fintechs and marketplace lenders, including the use of “special-purpose 
bank charters” but noting that no such practice currently exists).  
105. See FDIC: Marketplace Lending, supra note 96, at 14 (“In these cases, the 
[marketplace lender] collects borrower applications, assigns the credit grade, and solicits 
investor interest. However, from that point the [marketplace lender] refers the completed loan 
application packages to the partner bank that makes the loan to the borrower.”). 
106. See id. (“The partner bank typically holds the loan . . . . before selling it to the 
[marketplace lender]. Once the [marketplace lender] purchases the loan from the partner bank, 
it issues security notes up to the purchase amount to its retail investors who pledged to fund 
the loan.”). 
107. See id. at 13 fig. 2 (showing one potential incentivized route to marketplace lending 
arrangements between banks affiliated with marketplace companies and marketplace 
lenders/investors). 
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They might even choose to sell the loan to another lender.108  These sort 
of fees and incentive payments are what many fintechs base their business 
models on and why the Valid When Made doctrine is seen as so crucial 
to their existence.109  Without any Valid When Made doctrine, non-bank 
marketplace lenders could not help facilitate and buy loans with higher 
interest rates, as they could not enjoy any applicable choice of usury law 
from either the NBA or 12 U.S.C. § 1831d.110 
Fintechs also provide accessible banking and lending interfaces 
for consumers, as well as easier access to credit.111  In addition to 
benefiting the customer, banks enjoy the rise in potential customers and 
diversified lending opportunities.112  According to one commentator, only 
30% of users find traditional banking features “easy to use,” yet fintechs 
can streamline and enhance a quick-lending experience.113  In return for 
their services, these marketplace lenders may receive a fee or percentage 
from successfully cultivated loans.114  Some are even in the business of 
purchasing and managing the loans themselves.115  
 
108. See id. (showing another common route of debt transformation through the re-selling 
of an acquired loan to another marketplace lending arrangement). 
109. For a discussion on the valuable roles of fintechs in the U.S. economy, along with a 
discussion of how they have evolved and shifted their various business models, see Geoff 
Charles, The New Wave of FinTech Lending – 7 Essential Strategies, MEDIUM (Dec. 3, 2019), 
https://medium.com/@geoffcharles/the-new-wave-of-fintech-lending-7-essential-strategies-
cba5ac341910 [https://perma.cc/JB9V-SNEC] (offering examples of how Fintechs have 
shifted their lending models to increase their incentives, such as student loans and creating 
income sharing agreements instead of traditional loan arrangements). 
110. See supra Part III.A (discussing the NBA and its sister interest rate choice of law 
statute, 12 U.S.C. § 1831d).  
111. See Jackson, supra note 101 (observing that for many Americans, limited access to 
credit is “self-perpetuating” and that fintechs are uniquely poised to help address the issue). 
112. See FDIC: Marketplace Lending, supra note 96, at 12 (“Attracted by opportunities 
for earnings growth, some banks have entered the marketplace lending business either as 
investors or through third-party arrangements.”) 
113. See Laura Dreschler, Four Ways Fintech Has Changed the Lending Process and How 
Other Financial Institutions Can Keep Up, EXPERIAN (Mar. 21, 2019), 
https://www.experian.com/blogs/insights/2019/03/4-ways-fintech-changed-lending/ 
[https://perma.cc/9NH4-RUCQ] (discussing the positive impact(s) that fintechs have had on 
the lending market and offering suggestions as to how other lending institutions can stay 
competitive). 
114. See Jon Marino, Online Lenders Turned This Fee Into a Cash Cow, CNBC (May 6, 
2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/05/06/online-lenders-turned-this-fee-into-a-cash-cow-
fintech-startups-lending.html [https://perma.cc/DVD9-6ZVU] (tracing how Fintech Lending 
Club created a “lucrative source of revenue” by collecting loan origination fees). 
115. See Paul Sullivan, Fintechs Fill a Gap, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2020, at B3 (exploring the 
role of Fintechs who have gotten in the business  of originating and assuming Paycheck 
Protection Program small-business loans during COVID-19). 
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Moreover, it is not just fintechs who relied upon the Valid When 
Made doctrine to grow and operate their businesses.116  Debt collection 
agencies and smaller lenders with less access to capital have utilized the 
doctrine for much longer.117  In fact, Midland Funding, LLC, the named 
defendant in Madden, is a secondary debt collection agency with a 
business focused on buying past-due loan accounts in bulk from banks 
and marketplace lenders.118  In total, marketplace lending accounts for an 
over $1 trillion dollar per-year industry.119  This is hardly a negligible 
impact, but it is all predicated on a single assumption: that the Valid 
When Made doctrine is indeed good law.120 
The growth of fintechs within the secondary lending market has 
unquestionably helped both banks and their customers.121  However, one 
might notice that an unbridled embracing of the Valid When Made 
doctrine could allow much more unscrupulous lending arrangements to 
thrive.122  Entities such as “payday lenders”—who offer consumers quick 
access to capital in exchange for exorbitant interest rates—are generally 
what come to mind.123  If left without redress, these consumers could fall 
 
116. See generally Brief of the Structured Fin. Indus. Grp., Inc. & the Sec. Indus. & Fin. 
Mkts. 
Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 
F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015), 136 S. Ct. 2505 (No. 15-610), cert. denied, (illustrating the size and 
breadth of the secondary lending market). 
117. See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act § 802, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (1977) 
(providing an example of prohibitions and regulations affecting debt collection practices once 
a debt is assumed). 
118. FAQS About Midland Credit Management, MIDLAND FUNDING (2020), 
https://www.midlandfunding.com/faqs-mcm/ [ttps://perma.cc/4REU-RUT3] (noting that 
Midland Funding is a debt collector and “buys consumer debt”).  
119. Lo, supra note 18, at 64 (“Commentators have observed that [Madden] could sink the 
trillion-dollar secondary credit market.”). 
120. See Press Release, Marketplace Lending Ass’n, Valid When Made (Aug. 2017), 
http://marketplacelendingassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Valid-When-Made-1-
Pager-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/22D9-FLKF] (discussing the background of the Valid 
When Made doctrine, the reliance on it by marketplace lenders, and the—at the time 
pending—bill in Congress to codify the doctrine).  
121. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 100 (providing examples of how the growth of fintechs 
has helped banks and customers expand their markets and offerings). 
122. See Jayne Munger, Crossing State Lines: The Trojan Horse Invasion of Rent-A-Bank 
and Rent-A-Tribe Schemes in Modern Usury Law, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 468, 486–87 (2019) 
(noting that the difficulty with states deciding whether a loan transaction is in violation of 
their usury laws arises from the fact that many Rent-A-Bank and Rent-A-Tribe schemes are 
not, technically speaking, illegal). 
123. See, e.g., Scott Andrew Schaaf, From Checks to Cash: The Regulation of the Payday 
Lending Industry, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 339, 340 (2001) (discussing the development and 
role(s) of agency oversight and regulation over the payday lending industry, along with 
analyzing how effective said regulation(s) have been); see also Tasha L. Winebarger, The 
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victim to such lenders who take advantage of the Valid When Made 
doctrine to partner with a bank who can originate a predatory loan and 
immediately sell it to the secondary lender.124  To combat this, states and 
courts commonly employed the True Lender doctrine, aimed at thwarting 
these predatory schemes.125 
C.         The True Lender Doctrine 
While the Valid When Made doctrine finds its roots in decades 
of common law, the True Lender doctrine is a relatively new concept.126  
The True Lender doctrine was first seen in both judge-made and 
legislative forms,127 and it was widely employed in the wake of the 2008 
recession.128  To date, it has remained frequent in use, allowing courts 
and law enforcement to look deeper into a loan’s details in search of 
predatory practices.129  Despite its widespread usage post-2008, the True 
Lender doctrine can actually be traced to a much earlier rise in scrutiny 
 
Beginning of the End: The Demise of Bank Partnerships With Payday Lenders, 7 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 317, 318 (2003) (tracing the rise in payday lenders after financial crises). 
124. See What Is a Payday Loan?, CFPB (June 2, 2017), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-a-payday-loan-en-1567/ 
[https://perma.cc/UL3R-WYFY] (defining a payday loan as one that is typically short-term 
with high cost/interest rate, and is generally due at one’s next payday). 
125. See Munger, supa note 122, at 487 (“‘True [L]ender’ claims were first asserted against 
payday lenders who used rent-a-bank arrangements to evade state usury limits, and similar 
claims have been successfully asserted more recently in rent-a-tribe schemes.”). 
126. See Hannon, supra note 89, at 1280 (“The [T]rue [L]ender doctrine traces its origins 
to an effort by Georgia’s legislature to eliminate in-state payday lenders that were 
circumventing the state’s usury laws by entering into rent-a-charter arrangements with out-
of-state banks.”). 
127. The first judicial application of the True Lender doctrine appears to have come from 
New York in 2007.  Hannon, supra note 89, at 1281 (quoting People ex rel. Spitzer v. Cty. 
Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 846 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. App. Div.2007)); But see Ga. Code Ann. 
§ 16-17-2(b)(4) (2011) (exemplifying a statutory interpretation of the True Lender doctrine). 
128. See Hannon, supra note 89, at 1264 (“The [T]rue [L]ender test arose in the context of 
perhaps the most egregious extension of the ability to preempt state usury laws, wherein 
payday lenders and other nonbank entities have periodically obtained the benefits of the 
exportation doctrine by utilizing an arrangement commonly referred to as ‘rent-a-charter.’”). 
129. See, e.g., West Virginia v. CashCall, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 781, 783 (S.D. W.Va. 2009) 
(showcasing an application of the True Lender doctrine in which a court looked beyond the 
mere form of a loan/lending relationship in the midst of an apparent “Rent-A-Bank” scheme); 
see also, Press Release, Cal. Dep’t of Bus. Oversight DBO Launches Investigation Into 
Possible Evasion of Cal.’s New Int. Rate Caps by Prominent Auto Title Lender, LoanMart 
(Sept. 3, 2020), https://dfpi.ca.gov/ [https://perma.cc/KKT2-KXCA] (announcing a new 
action by the California Department of Business Oversight into a potential predatory lender). 
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regarding certain forms of lending relationships.130  In what became 
popularly known as “Rent-A-Charter” or “Rent-A-Bank”131 
arrangements, the United States as a whole started to become more aware 
of the ability for lenders to exploit an unqualified Valid When Made 
doctrine.132  Any time there is a dramatic rise in predatory lending 
targeting poor-credit and at-risk borrowers federal and state governments 
have needed to respond.133  Prior to the OCC’s Madden-fix rules, the 
interplay of the True Lender and Valid When Made doctrines was a 
successful tool in protecting consumers.134 
The background of the True Lender doctrine began as many 
predatory lenders would partner with a nationally chartered bank in the 
aforementioned schemes.135  In such arrangements, a bank would 
originate a loan, enabling the interest rate preemption granted by the NBA 
or  Section 1831d.136  The bank would then immediately offload the loan 
to a predatory lender who had typically arranged the transaction with the 
bank beforehand.137  The predatory lender could then charge the often 
exorbitant interest rate under the protection of the Valid When Made 
doctrine.138  
 
130. See, e.g., Winebarger, supra note 123, at 318 (citing Schaaf, supra note 123, at 340) 
(tracing the first rise of payday lenders to the 1980’s and an increased prevalence in consumers 
seeking short term loans); see also Scott A. Hefner, Payday Lending in North Carolina: Now 
You See It, Now You Don’t, 11 N.C. BANKING INST. 263, 271–74 (2007) (examining the 
history of payday lending in North Carolina during the mid 1990’s alongside the OCC’s 
response to regulation). 
131. For a good discussion of the common features and history of these arrangements, see 
Munger, supra note 122, at 471–76. 
132. See id. at 487–90 (noting the first application of “True Lender claims” against those 
entities that exploited the Valid When Made doctrine). 
133. See Kat Aaron, Predatory Lending: A Decade of Warnings, THE CTR. FOR PUB. 
INTEGRITY (May 6, 2009), https://publicintegrity.org/inequality-poverty-
opportunity/predatory-lending-a-decade-of-warnings/ [https://perma.cc/4524-85DV] (tracing 
the history of various laws and regulations and how predatory lenders would attempt to usurp 
state laws and how states responded). 
134. See Hannon, supra note 89, at 1264–65 (pinpointing the function and success(es) of 
the two doctrines). 
135. See Munger, supra note 122, at 475–79 (surveying the history of “Rent-A-Bank” and 
“Rent-A-Charter” arrangements and various state responses to them). 
136. See id. at 476 (outlining the development of the NBA and exportation of interest rates, 
along with the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and its impact on bank chartering and choosing 
headquarters locations). 
137. See id. at 477 (“In these arrangements, the alternative lender takes care of all the 
marketing and advertising, and the bank’s name is placed on the loan documents. The bank 
subsequently sells the loan to the lender, sometimes within twenty-four hours.”). 
138. See Christopher Baiamonte, Stopping Third-Party Debt Buyers from Using National 
Bank Act Preemption to Dodge State Usury Laws, 69 SYRACUSE L. REV. 127, 145 (2019) 
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In some instances, predatory lenders would charge interest rates 
in excess of hundreds or even thousands of percent.139  Some 
organizations even began to establish predatory lender watchlists to 
inform states and consumers before entering into a loan.140  However, the 
vast majority of banks have never engaged in predatory lending practices 
or arrangements.141  Indeed, both the OCC and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) have issued warnings against such 
relationships and their damaging impact(s) on the banking industry’s 
image.142  However, the mere existence of these lending arrangements 
and the potential problems they pose led many lenders to worry about the 
range of variability in the True Lender inquiries being applied across the 
country.143 
 
(noting that the most infamous predatory lending scheme, the “Payday Loan,” is proven to 
take advantage of sub-prime borrowers by charging “exorbitant interest rates”). 
139. As recently as June 5, 2020, the District of Columbia Attorney General announced a 
lawsuit utilizing the True Lender Inquiry against an infamous payday lender, Elevate, who 
regularly partners with FinWiseBank, a federally chartered bank in Utah, to offload loans. See 
Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen. for the Dist. of Columbia, AG Racine Sues Predatory 
Lender for Illegal High-Interest Loans to District Consumers (June, 2020), 
https://oag.dc.gov/release/ag-racine-sues-predatory-online-lender-illegal 
[https://perma.cc/Y77K-JTBZ] (pointing to how Elevate would regularly charge interest rates 
of up to 251-percent while “misrepresenting” its lending relationships). 
140. See High-Cost Rent-a-Bank Loan Watch List, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. (2020), 
https://www.nclc.org/issues/high-cost-small-loans/rent-a-bank-loan-watch-list.html 
[https://perma.cc/S7DK-MR99] (showcasing a comprehensive map and overview of 
predatory lenders found in each state). 
141. See Levitin: Trump Administration and Subprime Lenders, supra note 8 (observing 
that most banks do not engage in Rent-A-Bank arrangements because of their implications on 
operations and practices). 
142. The OCC has opined that predatory lending practices may involve “unfair and 
deceptive trade practices in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act.” Similarly, the 
FDIC has said that predatory lending activities are “inconsistent with safe and sound lending 
and undermine individual, family, and community economic well-being.” OFFICE OF THE 
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC ADVISORY LETTER AL 2003-2, GUIDELINES FOR 
NATIONAL BANKS TO GUARD AGAINST PREDATORY AND ABUSIVE LENDING PRACTICES (2003); 
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC INSTITUTION LETTERS FIL-6-2007, PREDATORY LENDING 
FDIC’S POLICY ON PREDATORY LENDING (2007). 
143. See Levitin: Trump Administration and Subprime Lenders, supra note 8 (discussing 
the variations in approaches to the Valid When Made and True Lender doctrines across the 
country). 
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D.         Applying the True Lender Doctrine 
In response to these predatory lending arrangements, many courts 
began to look beyond the simple question of whether or not a loan’s 
interest rate was valid if made by a bank.144  Instead, both legislative 
directives and their own initiatives allowed courts to examine deeper into 
the nature of a suspect lending relationship.145  In their varying versions 
of the True Lender doctrine, courts often found themselves reviewing 
suspect loans or lending relationships by looking at factors146 such as: (1) 
how long the originator held the loan before assigning it to a third 
party;147 (2) whether the third party provided the original lender with the 
capital to make the loan;148 (3) if the third party and lender had a 
prearranged agreement to pay minimum fees to the lender149 or even 
indemnify it;150 and (4) how the loan was reported.151 
In practice, the Valid When Made and True Lender doctrines 
worked in tandem.152  The former granted a blanket acceptance for a state 
or national bank to choose the interest rates of their place of headquarters 
before offloading it.153  The latter allowed states to enforce such laws 
against clearly predatory lending relationships if it appeared that the 
predatory lender, rather than the bank, was the true lender.154  Up until 
Madden and the OCC’s “Madden-fix,” these two doctrines appeared to 
be strongly accepted throughout the lending market.155 
 
144. Hannon, supra note 89, at 1265 (“In contrast to the inflexible and overbroad approach 
of the Madden court, the [T]rue [L]ender doctrine looks past the superficial form of rent-a-
charter arrangements to ascertain whether the bank that is entitled to the preemption of state 
laws is the real lender receiving such protection.”). 
145. See Adam Rust, Federal Regulators Should Refrain From Making a True Lender 
Rule, NAT’L COMTY REINVESTMENT COAL. (July 10, 2020) https://ncrc.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/VJ6L-HFSE] (pointing out examples of state enforcements of their usury 
laws via the use of the True Lender doctrine); see also Hannon, supra note 89, at 1280 (tracing 
the True Lender doctrine’s history in the US to a law in Georgia, GA. Code Ann. § 16-17-
2(b)(4) (2011)). 
146. The following references and factors have been taken directly from the OCC’s survey 
of the True Lender doctrine and can be found in: National Banks and Federal Savings 
Associations as Lenders,  85 Fed. Reg. 44,224 (proposed July 20, 2020) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 7) (proposing the new True Lender rule and tracing traditional approaches to the 
doctrine). 
147. See, e.g., CFPB v. CashCall, Inc., No. CV 15– 7522–JFW, 2016 WL 4820635, at *5-
6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2016) (examining ‘‘which party or entity has the predominant economic 
interest in the transaction,’’ including evaluating which party placed its money at risk). 
148. See id. at *6 (concluding that the third party was the True Lender, including because 
‘‘[a]lthough [the third party] waited a minimum of three days after the funding of each loan 
before purchasing it, it is undisputed that [the third party] purchased each and every loan 
before any payments on the loan had been made.’’); see also CashCall, Inc. v. Morrisey, No. 
12– 1274, 2014 WL 2404300, at *1-7 (W.Va. May 30, 2014) (noting that the third party 
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IV.  THE MADDEN-FIX RULES—THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY 
Between early June and the middle of October of 2020, the OCC 
issued and eventually published two rules in response to Madden.156  
Similarly, the FDIC published its own Valid When Made rule, with calls 
for it to release a True Lender rule as well.157  Almost immediately after 
publication, several state attorney generals filed suit against both the 
 
purchased loans within three days of origination but not clearly indicating whether this fact 
was considered as part of the predominant economic interest analysis); see also Sawyer v. 
Bill Me Later, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 3d 1359, 1369 (D. Utah 2014) (noting that the named lender 
was the real party in interest, including because it ‘‘holds the credit receivables for two 
days’’).  
149. See, e.g., CFPB v. CashCall, Inc., No. CV 15– 7522–JFW, 2016 WL 4820635, at 
*2,*6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2016) (‘‘[The third party] guaranteed [the named lender] a 
minimum payment of $100,000 per month, as well as a $10,000 monthly administrative fee.’’) 
(‘‘It is undisputed that [the third party] deposited enough money into a reserve account to 
fund two days of loans, calculated on the previous month’s daily average and that [the named 
lender] used this money to fund consumer loans.’’).  
150. Id. at *3 (‘‘[The third party] agreed to ‘fully indemnify [the named lender] for all costs 
arising or resulting from any and all civil, criminal or administrative claims or actions . . . .’ 
’’); see also CashCall, Inc. v. Morrisey, No. 12– 1274, 2014 WL 2404300, at *7 (W.Va. May 
30, 2014) (noting that the Circuit Court found that the third party agreed to indemnify the 
named lender). 
151. See CashCall, 2014 WL 2404300, at *1–7 (noting that loans were treated as if they 
were funded by the third party for financial reporting purposes).  
152. Hannon, supra note 89, at 1275–76 n. 87 (“Stated another way, the [T]rue [L]ender 
doctrine seeks to identify whether loans truly were valid-when-made, and only an affirmative 
answer will even trigger application of the Madden fix law.”). 
153. Munger, supra note 122, at 487 (“’True lender’ claims were first asserted against 
payday lenders who used rent-a-bank arrangements to evade state usury limits, and similar 
claims have been successfully asserted more recently in rent-a-tribe schemes.”) (citing CFPB 
v. CashCall, Inc., No. CV 15-7522-JFW (RAOx), 2016 WL 4820635, at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 
31, 2016)). 
154. Supra Part II.A–B. 
155. See Horn & Hall, supra note 24, at 7 (noting that the reliance of lenders on the 
doctrines and how, prior to Madden, there appeared to be no reason to question their 
application). 
156. See National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders,  85 Fed. Reg. 
68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (announcing the OCC’s final True 
Lender rule on October 30, 2020); see also Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, 
Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 85 Fed. Reg. 33,530-36 (June 2, 2020) (to be codified at 
12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160) (announcing the OCC’s final Valid When Made rule on June 2, 
2020). 
157. The FDIC version of the Valid When Made rule covers all state-chartered banks and 
insured branches of foreign banks. See Federal Interest Rate Authority, 85 Fed. Reg. 44,146 
(July 22, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 331). Note that the FDIC has not introduced a 
“True Lender” rule as of the writing of this Note.  
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OCC and FDIC opposing these rules.158  However, these suits all focused 
on potential violations of the Administrative Procedure Act.159  Outside 
advocacy groups have also threatened suit, largely focusing on the rules’ 
impact on vulnerable consumers in the context of the COVID-19 national 
pandemic.160  As one suit claims, in the midst of unemployment rates that 
have not been seen since the Great Depression, the OCC is “pushing hard 
and fast” for rules that will “embolden predatory lenders” to take 
advantage of struggling families.161  And for one to fully appreciate the 
opposition to these rules, it is first necessary to examine the Madden-fix 
itself.162 
A.         The Valid When Made and True Lender Doctrines 
The first of the two Madden-fix rules dealt with the Valid When 
Made doctrine.163  In its final rule, the OCC stated that a loan’s interest 
rate that originates with a bank stays with the loan regardless of sale, 
 
158. See California v. OCC, No. 4:20-cv-05200 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2020) (showing the 
major lawsuit filed by several states Attorneys General against the OCC for its Madden-fix 
rules); see also, California v. FDIC, No.  4:20-cv-05860 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 20, 2020) (showing 
the major lawsuit filed by several states Attorneys General against the FDIC for its Madden-
fix rules).  
159. FDIC, No. 4:20-cv-05860, at 6 (“This action arises under the Administrative 
Procedure Act.”).  
160. NCLC Press Release, supra note 26 (arguing that the OCC’s proposed “True Lender” 
rule is unconstitutional and threatening a lawsuit upon its passing). 
161. Id. (“It is shocking that in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic with unemployment 
at a level not seen since the Great Depression that the OCC is pushing hard and fast on a 
proposal that will embolden predatory lenders while trapping many struggling families with 
long-term debt.”). 
162. The combination of the two final rules issued by the OCC in response to Madden are 
colloquially referred to as the “Madden-fix” by many commentators. Almost immediately 
after its holding was published, the OCC has been vocal in its opposition to Madden’s holding, 
thus seeking to “fix” it. See James Kim & Jeremy T. Rosenblum, Three State Attack on the 
OCC’s “Madden-Fix” Rule, JD SUPRA (Aug. 4, 2020), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/three-state-attack-on-the-occ-s-madden-18013/ 
[https://perma.cc/4Q4T-WXST] (noting that the OCC’s opposition to Madden’s holding 
began under the Obama Administration). For a good introduction to the OCC’s two rules that 
form the Madden-fix, see Cumming et. al, supra note 43 (offering an overview of the OCC’s 
Valid When Made doctrine rule); see also Wilmarth Jr., supra note 23 (discussing the OCC’s 
True Lender doctrine rule and offering criticisms and reasons why it should be withdrawn). 
163. See Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 
85 Fed. Reg. 33,530-36 (June 2, 2020) (showing the OCC’s final Valid When Made rule); see 
also Robertson, supra note 14 (discussing the various approaches to interpreting Madden’s 
holding and observing where and how some began to initially question the viability of the 
Valid When Made doctrine). 
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transfer, or assignment.164  This rule simply took the Valid When Made 
doctrine and granted it a seat of official recognition as a complement to 
the NBA and Section 1831d’s choice of state usury laws.165  According 
to the OCC, Section 85 of the NBA was “conspicuous” in its silence on 
the impact of loan assignments on the loan’s interest rate,166 authorizing 
it to address the Valid When Made doctrine even when Madden did 
not.167  
Almost immediately, the OCC was criticized for failing to seize 
the moment and answer the question of how deeply courts should look to 
discover a loan’s true lender, and what they should they look for.168  This 
criticism arose both from those who saw the opportunity to offer more 
consistency across the market post-Madden,169 but arguably more 
 
164. Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 85 
Fed. Reg. 33,530 (June 2, 2020) (“[B]anks are generally authorized to sell, assign, or 
otherwise transfer loans and to enter into and assign loan contracts. . . . [R]ecent developments 
have created legal uncertainty about the ongoing permissibility of the interest term after a 
bank transfers a loan. This rule clarifies that when a bank transfers a loan, the interest 
permissible before the transfer continues to be permissible after the transfer.”) (emphasis 
added). 
165. The OCC’s ruling spent a significant amount of time discussing questions of whether 
it had the authority under the NBA to issue such a pronouncement. While the OCC of course 
claimed that it did, this issue is also at the center of some of the aforementioned litigation by 
the states Attorneys General. See State of California v. OCC, No. 4:20-cv-05200 (N.D. Cal. 
July 29, 2020); see also Brian S. Korn, et al., OCC Affirms “Valid When Made” Doctrine, 
MANATT (June 3, 2020), https://www.manatt.com/insights/newsletters/client-alert/occ-
affirms-valid-when-made-doctrine [https://perma.cc/Q5H6-ZWMY] (stating the Comptroller 
of the Currency, Brian Brooks’ stance on the OCC’s final Valid When Made rule). 
166. Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 85 
Fed. Reg. 33,531 (June 2, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160) (“Therefore, 
section 85’s (NBA) silence in this regard is ‘conspicuous[ ],’ and the OCC may interpret 
section 85 to resolve this silence.”) 
167. Id. at 33,530 (“Many supporting commenters also agreed that the OCC has the 
authority to address this issue by regulation and that the proposal reflected a permissible 
interpretation of relevant Federal banking law.”). 
168. See, e.g., Comment Letter from the Conference of State Bank Supervisors to the OCC, 
(Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.csbs.org/policy/csbs-comment-letter-permissible-interest-loans-
are-sold-assigned-or-otherwise-transferred [https://perma.cc/GG3F-HZS5] [hereinafter 
Conference of State Bank Supervisors Comment Letter] (requesting that the OCC “clarify and 
revise the proposed rule to ensure that its impact on state law rights and remedies—including 
the [T]rue [L]ender doctrine and other state law requirements—does not exceed the stated 
intention of the proposed rule.”). 
169. See id. (asking the OCC to clarify its Valid When Made rule to offer more market 
consistency and understanding); see also Rosenblum, supra note 44 (explaining the OCC’s 
claimed reasoning for not addressing the True Lender doctrine originally). 
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worrisome, also from the lobbying and pressuring efforts of payday 
lenders and other potentially predatory businesses.170 
In response, the OCC issued its interpretation of when and how 
to tell if the bank is the true lender in a loan.171  In the OCC’s view, 
whenever a bank makes a loan—which it must do for the NBA or Section 
1831d’s choice of usury laws to even apply in the first place—it is the 
true lender if it is named as such or if it provides the financial resources 
for the loan.172  The OCC also stated that if one bank is named as the 
lender, but another party funds the loan, it is the named bank who is the 
true lender.173  According to the OCC, these rules were intended to offer 
clarity and certainty to the secondary lending market.174  While they very 
while might have created the desired certainty, these rules left some key 
questions unanswered.175  In response to over 4,000 comment letters—
many of which expressed concern that this rule would allow for predatory 
lenders to circumvent state usury laws—the OCC rejected this fear, 
stating that its “robust supervisory framework” would prevent such 
occurrences.176 
 
170. See, e.g., California v. OCC, No. 4:20-cv-05200 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2020) (explaining 
payday lender lobbying efforts in opposition of state usury laws); see also Munger, supra note 
122, at 468–98 (discussing other lobbying efforts by the payday loan industry to fight 
consumer protection laws). 
171. See National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders,  85 Fed. Reg. 
68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (finalizing the OCC’s True Lender 
doctrine rule). 
172. See id. (“Under this rule, a bank makes a loan if, as of the date of origination, it is 
named as the lender in the loan agreement or funds the loan.”). 
173. See id. at 68,745 (“[W]here one bank is named as the lender in the loan agreement 
and another bank funds the loan, the bank named as the lender in the loan agreement makes 
the loan.”).  
174. See National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders,  85 Fed. Reg. 
44,223, 44,224 (proposed July 22, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (“To address this 
uncertainty, the OCC is proposing a clear test to determine when a bank makes a loan.”); see 
also Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 85 
Fed. Reg. 33,530–36 (June 2, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160) (“Consistent 
with the proposal, this regulation addresses that legal uncertainty by clarifying and reaffirming 
the longstanding understanding that a bank may transfer a loan without affecting the 
permissible interest term.”). 
175.  Note that this blog post was written before the OCC’s True Lender doctrine rule. 
However, it provides good insight into an example of the types of questions that were typically 
asked and discussed by commentators to the OCC’s Madden-fix rules. See Curtin et al., supra 
note 17 (observing that the Madden-fix for the Valid When Made doctrine failed to address 
state-chartered banks and, at the time, the True Lender doctrine question). 
176. See National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg. 68,745 
(Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (emphasizing the OCC’s “robust supervisory 
framework” in protecting consumers and overseeing banks). 
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B.         Positives of the Madden-Fix (the Good) 
This form-over-substance approach by the OCC has many 
practical issues,177 but it may well provide some of the answers that 
Madden’s observers sought.178  Undoubtedly, the Madden-fix garnered a 
collective sigh of relief for the multitude of marketplace lenders that 
relied upon these doctrines.179  As the OCC pointed out in its rulemaking 
commentary, the questions created by Madden left many banks 
wondering if they could still use the “risk management tool” of offloading 
risky debts and loans to free up capital.180  As support for both of its rules, 
the OCC pointed to the uncertainty that it perceived to be plaguing the 
lending market and used it as justification for its new rules.181  While 
 
177. See generally, Center for Responsible Lending, et al., Comments to the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (Sept. 3, 2020) https://consumerfed.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/09/OCC-True-Lender-Comment_Sept3_FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TY8U-PXSV] [hereinafter Center for Responsible Lending Comment 
Letter] (providing a comprehensive discussion of the wide range of issues with the OCC’s 
Madden-fix rules and mapping their potential impact(s) on consumers, small businesses, and 
the lending market in general). 
178. Even many of the observers who support the Madden-fix rules have noted areas and 
questions that are still unanswered, such as an identical FDIC rule as well as related state 
litigation which is mentioned in Part IV of this Note. See Eric T. Mitzenmacher et al., The 
OCC Finalizes “Madden Fix” Regulation, Codifying the “Valid-when-Made” Doctrine as 
Applicable to Loans Made by National Banks and Federal Savings Associations, CONSUMER 
FIN. SERVICES REVIEW, (May 30, 2020) https://www.cfsreview.com/2020/05/the-occ-
finalizes-madden-fix-regulation-codifying-the-valid-when-made-doctrine-as-applicable-to-
loans-made-by-national-banks-and-federal-savings-associations/ [https://perma.cc/B3NN-
GBKM] (“The OCC’s rule is a positive development for those seeking regulatory certainty 
for the secondary market in bank-originated loans and defending Madden claims.”) 
179. See Cumming et al., supra note 43 (stating that the Madden-fix rules provided much-
needed clarity to the lending market. 
180. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC Bulletin 2020–10, 
THIRD-PARTY RELATIONSHIPS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS TO SUPPLEMENT OCC 
BULLETIN 2013–29 (Mar. 5, 2020), at *1 (clarifying the OCC’s suggested approach for banks 
operating in third party loan arrangement scenarios); see also, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER 
OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULLETIN 2013–29, THIRD-PARTY RELATIONSHIPS: RISK 
MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE (Oct. 30, 2013), at *1 (telling banks under the OCC how they should 
work to limit their risk and ensure proper compliance with relevant lending laws). 
181. See National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders,  85 Fed. Reg.  
68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (“However, there is often uncertainty 
about how to determine which entity is making the loans and, therefore, the laws that apply 
to these loans.”); see also Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or 
Otherwise Transferred, 85 Fed. Reg. 33,530 (June 2, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 
and 160) (“Despite these authorities, recent developments have created legal uncertainty 
about the ongoing permissibility of the interest term after a bank transfers a loan.”). 
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arguable in their effectiveness, the positive intentions of the Madden-fix 
are clear.182 
Primarily, these rules will likely provide clarity to the businesses 
which were intended to benefit.183  The secondary lending market will be 
able to return to their business models of acquiring loans from state and 
national banks without worrying about the Saliha Maddens of the world 
challenging the applicability of their loan’s interest rate.184  Furthermore, 
as intended, these rules will very likely help banks continue to offload 
risky loans and debts to the aforementioned companies, thereby keeping 
the companies in business and freeing up necessary capital for the 
banks.185  From a consumer perspective, more free capital for banks 
means a higher potential access to credit for borrowers.186  For example, 
several months of the COVID-19 pandemic saw historically low interest 
 
182. See Cumming et al., supra note 43 (outlining the potential benefits of the OCC’s Valid 
When Made doctrine Madden-fix, but discussing unanswered areas); see also David Clem, 
OCC’s New “True Lender” Rule Already Having Positive Effects: Colorado Settles Long-
Running “True Lender” Case, IRGLOBAL (Oct. 5, 2020), 
https://www.irglobal.com/article/occs-new-true-lender-rule-already-having-positive-effects-
colorado-settles-long-running-true-lender-case/ [https://perma.cc/6YDE-UARP] (providing 
one of the first examples of the OCC True Lender doctrine Madden-fix in use).  
183. See Cumming et al., supra note 43 (“[T]he OCC’s final rule has the potential to 
provide an additional arrow in the quiver for fintechs and others that purchase bank-made 
loans.”) 
184. Scott Stewart, Why Small Businesses Need Regulator’s Proposed “Madden-Fix,” AM. 
BANKER (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/why-small-businesses-
need-regulators-proposed-madden-fix [https://perma.cc/E26E-TYQV] (“Just like every 
major corporation, small businesses need to have access to credit to hire more employees, 
expand or simply maintain in times of hardship. Most entrepreneurs rely on the lending market 
to grow.”). 
185. See Cumming et al., supra note 43 (discussing some of the perceived benefits that the 
Madden-fix rules will have for the secondary lending market). 
186. There is some debate over the actual dollar-impact of how much increased capital 
impacts consumer lending, but it is without a doubt that it has some positive impact(s). See 
Press Release, Treasury Dept. (TG-95), Treasury Sec’y Timothy Geithner, Opening Remarks 
as Prepared for Delivery to the Congressional Oversight Panel, (April 21, 2009) (stating that 
a one-dollar capital injection generates between eight and twelve-dollars of lending capacity); 
but see FED. RESERVE BD.-DIV’S OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS AND MONETARY AFFAIRS, THE 
EFFECTS OF BANK CAPITAL ON LENDING: WHAT DO WE KNOW, AND WHAT DOES IT MEAN 
(Aug. 17, 2010) (reviewing and concluding that the impact of capital for banks on increased 
lending capacity may be different than what was previously thought). 
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rates and an exponential growth in the housing market.187  In these 
situations, easier credit access can lead to rapid lending market growth.188  
However, the OCC failed to provide for any sort of a stop-gap 
that would prevent predatory lenders from taking advantage of these 
opportunities in the future.189  At the outset, it appears as though the OCC 
sought to relegate Madden to nothing more than a blip on the otherwise 
stable history of the Valid When Made and True Lender doctrines.190  In 
their pursuit of “clarity” and “stability,” one need not look much deeper 
to realize the serious issues poised by the OCC’s Madden-fix rules.191  
C.         Issues with the Madden-Fix (the Bad and the Ugly) 
The major failure of the Madden-fix lies within its overbroad and 
overinclusive nature.192  The OCC had an invaluable opportunity to 
provide the clarity that many sought post-Madden,193 but it chose to issue 
two rules that were underwhelming in form and created considerable 
 
187. See Greg Rosalsky, Parts of America See Housing Boom During The COVID-19 
Pandemic, NPR (Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/11/911828398/parts-of-
america-see-housing-boom-during-the-covid-19-pandemic [https://perma.cc/YNX9-XE88] 
(highlighting some of the areas of the U.S. that have seen a rise in housing demand even 
during the COVID-19 pandemic and attempting to trace the causes). 
188. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Comm’n, Fintech Lending: Financial Inclusion, Risk Pricing, 
and Alternative Information, FDIC (June 16, 2017), fdic.gov/analysis/cfr/bank-research-
conference/annual-17th/papers/14-jagtiani.pdf [https://perma.cc/FH4F-39BN] at 7 
(discussing how increased information on consumers allows Fintechs to provide easier access 
to credit for business and consumers who might otherwise be limited in their access to 
traditional bank lenders). 
189. Levitin: Trump Administration and Subprime Lenders, supra note 8 (“[The Madden-
fix rules] will effectively allow[] subprime consumer lending that is not subject to any interest 
rate regulation, including by unlicensed lenders.”) 
190. See Mitzenmacher et al., supra note 178 (discussing the OCC’s response to Madden 
and what the author believes is still left to be done and answered). 
191. See Levitin: Trump Administration and Subprime Lenders, supra note 8 (discussing 
how the Madden-fix rules will potentially have seriously negative impacts on at-risk 
consumers);  see also 21 States Urge OCC to Withdraw Proposed Madden Fix, LAW 360 (Jan. 
22, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1236552/21-states-urge-occ-to-withdraw-
proposed-madden-fix [https://perma.cc/XAQ8-XRK3] (highlighting an example of the legal 
opposition to the OCC’s Madden-fix rules, including challenges based within the 
Administrative Procedure Act). 
192. See Prof. Arthur E. Wilmarth , Comment Letter in Opposition to the OCC’s “True 
Lender Rule,” (Aug. 11, 2020) at *3–4, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3673421 [https://perma.cc/9VEM-JE9] 
[hereinafter Wilmarth “True Lender” Comment Letter] (listing the practical issues and 
implications that will likely arise from the two OCC rules). 
193. See, e.g., Michael Cumming et al., supra note 43 (discussing how the OCC’s Madden-
fix Valid When Made rule could help offer clarity to a market left in limbo post-Madden). 
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potential for consumer harm in their function.194  Assuming that the OCC 
truly saw Madden as an assault on these doctrines, it is strange that its 
response would be to craft two rules which effectively undermine decades 
of state usury laws.195  
Even more curious is why the OCC would not engage in a joint 
rulemaking with the FDIC in response to these questions. 196  Both 
agencies cited the need for “clarity” yet published their own rules with 
their own comments and responses.197  The similarity in both intent and 
function of the NBA and Section 1831d might lead one to think that a 
bank’s national versus state charter should not be a concern when 
applying the Valid When Made and True Lender doctrines.198  While the 
 
194. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 23 (“The proposed rule is contrary to the public interest 
because it would allow national banks and federal savings associations to establish ‘rent-a-
charter’ schemes with payday lenders and other predatory nonbank lenders, thereby 
encouraging abusive practices that would inflict very serious injuries on consumers and small 
businesses.”) 
195. NCLC Press Release, supra note 26 (“The OCC’s proposed rule would prevent courts 
from examining the real nature of a predatory rent-a-bank scheme, help predatory lenders 
conceal their schemes from judicial review, and turn state usury laws into the ‘dead letter’ 
that the Supreme Court predicted in 1835.”) 
196. Federal Agencies are free to engage in joint rulemaking measures. While each 
involved agency must propose and publish its own final rule(s), there is generally no limitation 
on multiple agencies working in concert during the process.  It is worth noting that in function, 
both the OCC and FDIC’s Valid When Made rules are very similar. While the latter revised 
the text of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (“FDIA”) text section 331.4(e) to align with the 
OCC’s rule more closely, the two results are generally the same. However, unlike the OCC’s 
rule, the FDIC’s Valid When Made rule explicitly states that it will unfavorably view entities 
who partner with banks to evade state usury laws. The OCC has made no such statement in 
as clear of terms. See NOTICE-AND-COMMENT RULEMAKING, ADMIN. CONF. OF THE UNITED 
STATES (2020) (outlining different methods of agency rulemaking, including joint 
rulemaking). 
197. Note that the FDIC has not issued a similar “True Lender” rule as of the writing of 
this Note. In fact, the FDIC has openly questioned its authority to issue such a rule despite 
calls for one. See Alan S. Kaplinsky, FDIC Questions Its Authority to Issue “True Lender” 
Rule, CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR (Dec. 9, 2020), https://consumerfinancemontior.com 
[https://perma.cc/2CBE-NW6H] (stating that the FDIC, unlike the OCC, does not believe it 
possesses the statutory authority to issue a True Lender rule, despite calls for it to do so). 
198. The NBA and 12 U.S.C. § 1831d operate concurrently, with the former providing the 
same choice of interest rate protections to nationally-chartered banks as the latter does for 
state-chartered banks. Indeed, even the Second Circuit in Madden recognized that if a lender 
was a non-bank entity, that it could not alone enjoy the choice of interest rate law(s) granted 
by the NBA (and § 1831d). Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 247 (2d Cir. 
2015) (“Because neither defendant is a national bank nor a subsidiary or agent of a national 
bank . . . . we reverse the District Court’s holding that the NBA preempts Madden’s claims . 
. . .”). 
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absence of a joint rulemaking might seem peculiar, it also leads to the 
potential that the rules could be overturned.199 
Prior to Madden, state usury laws and a bank’s ability to choose 
which one it would apply existed in relative harmony.200  However, one 
of the most problematic themes from the Madden-fix rules is their lack 
of qualifying instructions for states.201  Without any limits, these rules 
have no way of preventing predatory lenders from gaining just as much 
advantage as the legitimate businesses that the OCC intended to help.202  
A vague reference to a “robust oversight framework” is likely of little 
comfort to the states and entities who now find their enforcement and 
consumer protection powers stripped away by federal agencies.203 
Regarding the True Lender doctrine, the OCC recognized 
variation in applications amongst courts.204  Still, the agency did not cite 
a single instance where these varying applications led to a wrong 
conclusion before Madden.205  Instead, the OCC pointed to a need for 
clarity for lenders to know just what to expect when facing a court looking 
into the nature of its loan.206  With that comes the initial question of why 
the OCC found this rule necessary when it offered no instances of a 
wrongfully applied inquiry prior to Madden.207  Did legitimate lenders 
truly have that much to worry about with this inquiry?  The OCC’s 
 
199. While arguably unlikely, this Note recognizes the role that the Congressional Review 
Act (“CRA”) could play in overturning either rule. As final rules, there is the potential that 
the CRA’s backstop could allow for Congress to review these rules. See 5 U.S.C. § 8 (1996); 
see also infra Part V.  
200. See Baiamonte, supra note 138, at 127 (2019) (challenging the Valid When Made 
doctrine but recognizing its role and existence).  
201. See Kim & Rosenblum, supra note 162 (discussing the lawsuit by three states 
Attorneys General on the OCC’s Madden-fix, including the claim that “[T]he OCC did not 
give meaningful consideration to the rule’s facilitation of ‘rent-a-charter’ schemes by 
predatory lenders.”). 
202. Levitin: Trump Administration and Subprime Lenders, supra note 8 (“[The Madden-
fix rules] will effectively allow[] subprime consumer lending that is not subject to any interest 
rate regulation, including by unlicensed lenders.”) 
203. See NCLC Press Release, supra note 26 (claiming that states will be left powerless to 
enforce their usury laws, should the Madden-fix rules be left as-is). 
204. See generally National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders,  85 Fed. 
Reg. 68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) and cases cited therein. 
205. See id. (offering no explicit examples, beyond Madden, of a faulty application of the 
True Lender inquiry). 
206. Id. at 68,745 (“This approach will provide additional clarity and allow stakeholders, 
including borrowers, to easily identify the bank that makes the loan.”). 
207. See National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders,  85 Fed. Reg. 
44,224 (Proposed July 22, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (offering examples of 
varying applications and factors within the previous approach to the True Lender doctrine as 
stated by the OCC in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the True Lender final rule). 
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provided case law seems to indicate that they did not.208  Nevertheless, 
the OCC opines about Madden, leading to a potential discouragement of 
bank and third-party relationships and a “chill[ing] of innovation” had it 
not answered the True Lender question.209 
In a grander sense, these two rules work together to render state 
usury laws null and void in the realm of stopping the Rent-A-Bank 
scheme.210  Without qualification or limitation, predatory lenders have 
practically been invited to come back into relevance with a new shield.211  
Unlike past responses to rises in these predatory schemes, states will now 
be left watching on the sidelines.212  States will now be powerless to look 
any further than who originated the loan in form and whether that entity 
was allowed to choose a certain state’s usury laws when deciding on an 
interest rate.213 
In evaluating this hapless approach to clarity within the secondary 
lending market, one cannot help but think of a scene from the movie The 
Naked Gun.214  As Detective Frank Drebin stands in front of an exploding 
fireworks store, he tells onlookers to move along, saying, “there is 
nothing to see here,” as chaos ensues behind him.215  In their response to 
Madden, the OCC has assumed the role of Drebin, attempting to usher 
the lending market along for better or worse, no questions asked.216  But 
 
208. See id. (citing various factors and case law that the OCC claimed showed an 
inexcusable variance in True Lender approaches which it sought to clarify). 
209. Id. (“This uncertainty may discourage banks and third parties from entering into 
relationships, limit competition, and chill the innovation that results from these [marketplace 
lending] partnerships.”). 
210. See, e.g., NCLC Press Release, supra note 26 (claiming that the Madden-fix rules strip 
the states of their enforcement powers of usury laws and will leave consumers to suffer). 
211. Levitin: Trump Administration and Subprime Lenders, supra note 8 (“The rulemaking 
green lights unregulated subprime lending nationwide.”). 
212. For a thorough analysis of the varying roles of consumer protection laws in post-2008 
and the major regulations that arose as a result, see Sean Ross, What Major Laws Were 
Created for the Financial Sector Following the 2008 Crisis?, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 31, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/063015/what-are-major-laws-acts-regulating-
financial-institutions-were-created-response-2008-financial.asp [https://perma.cc/T99Q-
47VW] (discussing the various consumer protection laws following 2008 and spanning the 
George Bush and Barack Obama Presidential Administrations). 
213. Wilmarth “True Lender” Comment Letter, supra note 192, at 2 (“The proposed rule 
would unlawfully override state ‘[T]rue [L]ender’ laws without congressional authorization 
and in contravention of applicable court decisions.”). 
214. THE NAKED GUN (Paramount Pictures 1988). 
215. See id.  
216. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 23 (“The proposed [True Lender] rule unlawfully seeks to 
override state ‘[T]rue [L]ender’ laws without congressional authorization and in 
contravention of applicable court decisions. The proposed rule ignores the substance-over-
form analysis and the multifactor tests that have been applied in those decisions.”). 
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unlike Drebin, the OCC must turn around and face the reality of the 
darker potential of its current actions, either revising them or risking their 
overturn.217 
V.  POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO PROTECT CONSUMERS 
The Madden-fix needs fixing.  The potential for limitless free 
reign of predatory lenders partnering with nationally chartered banks to 
extract exorbitant interest rates is a problem which should make the OCC 
worried.  There is no doubt that the lending market craves stability and 
predictability.218  As a multitude of lawsuits and criticisms make clear, 
the OCC is and will continue to be pressured to change these rules.219  In 
a preemptive attempt to explore what a clearer response to Madden might 
entail, this Note presents three potential solutions to remedy the OCC’s 
conundrum.  The final option220 is offered as the preferred approach for 
the OCC to truly provide clarity and stability while also precluding 
predatory lending relationships. 
Underlying all these solutions is the possibility that Congress may 
utilize the Congressional Review Act (“CRA”) to overturn the Madden-
fix rules.  The CRA provides a mandatory sixty day review period for all 
agency rules.221  While unlikely, due to the highly divided makeup of the 
116th and 117th Congresses,222 the significant changes and potential 
 
217. As this Note posits, the two most likely ways that these rules would be overturned 
would either be via that Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808) or under a new 
Presidential Administration and a new Comptroller of the Currency. See 12 U.S.C. § 2; see 
also infra Part V and Part V.A. 
218. U.S. Dep’t. of the Treasury, Fin. Stability Oversight Council,  
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-markets-financial-institutions-and-fiscal-
service/fsoc [https://perma.cc/EZS3-JV7E] (“The Council is charged with identifying risks to 
the financial stability of the United States; promoting market discipline; and responding to 
emerging risks to the stability of the United States' financial system.”). 
219. To review the two largest and most noteworthy lawsuits against the OCC and FDIC 
for their Madden-fixes, see California v. OCC, No. 4:20-cv-05200 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2020); 
see also California v. FDIC, No.  4:20-cv-05860 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2020). 
220. See infra Part V.C.  
221. See 5 U.S.C. § 801 (1996) (stating the mandatory 60-day review period for Congress 
over Agency action(s)); see also 5 U.S.C. § 804(2) (1996) (defining a “major” rule). 
222. The CRA requires a joint Congressional resolution signifying disapproval, along with 
either a signature from the President or an override of any veto. 5 U.S.C. § 801 (1996). The 
116th Congress was comprised of mostly Democrats in the House and Republicans in the 
Senate, making joint resolution unlikely. Membership of the  116th Congress: A Profile, 
Cong. Res. Serv. at 1 (Dec. 17, 2020) https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45583.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8MD4-P6SJ]. While the 117th Congress does feature a Democrat majority 
in both the House and Senate, the Senate majority is courtesy of the tie-breaking vote of Vice 
President Kamala Harris. Therefore, a joint resolution would still be unlikely due to the 
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impacts of these rules might subject them to legislative review and even 
overturn.223  The timing of their release and publications could very well 
preclude the CRA from being an effective tool for addressing the 
shortcomings of the Madden-fix rules.224  Additionally, any other typical 
method of affecting legislative change would be cumbersome and 
unlikely to succeed.225  
A.         Return to the Pre-Madden Days 
The first solution is the most drastic.  The OCC should consider 
abandoning its Madden-fix rules and allow the market to return to its pre-
Madden state.  Embracing this solution would mean that one would have 
to agree that Madden was in fact narrow in its applicability and that the 
Valid When Made doctrine was set to remain effective.226  Supporters of 
this line of argument point to a variety of places to buttress this stance.227  
From viewing the NBA and Section 1831d’s choice of state usury rates 
as more of an estoppel versus a preemption228 to stating that Madden was 
 
potential for even a single vote by a Democrat in opposition to likely render any action null 
and void. See Members of the 117th Congress, GOVPREDICT (Dec. 4, 2020), 
https://www.govpredict.com/blog/the-members-of-the-117th-congress 
[https://perma.cc/QC2Z-YHC8] (outlining the demographics and affiliations of the 117th 
Congress and its members). 
223. OIRA has determined that neither rules are “major rules” under 5 U.S.C. § 804(2). 
Even still, Congress would have sixty session days from the rule’s publication in the Federal 
Register to then file a joint resolution of opposition. 5 U.S.C. § 802. 
224. The Valid When Made rule was promulgated by the OCC on June 2, 2020, which 
would mean that the sixty days of the CRA would have ran by the writing of this Note. 
However, the True Lender rule was promulgated on October 30, 2020, meaning that the sixty 
session days have not yet run. Also note that both rules are to be published in the Federal 
Register thirty days after their promulgation, further extending the likelihood that a new 
Congress could review and overturn the True Lender rule.  
225. Consumers are always able to lobby for greater protections at the state level. For 
instance, a state that is generally friendly to higher interest rates such as Delaware or Nevada 
might enact consumer protection legislation and introduce new usury laws. However, this 
cumbersome process would leave many consumers exposed to predatory lending for 
indefinite periods of time in states that are known for their history of high interest rates.  
226. See Baiamonte, supra note 138, at 149–52 (arguing that non-bank loan purchasers 
should not enjoy the NBA’s choice of state usury laws as it could lead to predatory lending 
but concluding that the Valid When Made doctrine, while stable, is suspect in its own right).  
227. See Lo, supra note 18, at 67–71 (critiquing Madden and arguing that its impact over 
time will be limited); see also Horn & Hall, supra note 24, at 2 ("Although Madden is having 
an adverse short-term impact, we believe that ultimately it will be properly limited in its scope 
and impact, will not be embraced across the board by other state or federal courts, and will 
not result in significant changes to the law and principles of bank lending and usury.”). 
228. See Levitin Predatory Lending, supra note 8 (“The National Bank Act does not render 
a loan non-usurious. Instead, it preempts application of the usury law against the National 
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simply wrong by ignoring the Valid When Made doctrine.229 The main 
theme with this solution is the idea that the lending world did not actually 
change much post-Madden.230  
This option would undoubtedly be the most contentious. Just as 
there are those who believe that Madden had little impact on the lending 
market, there are others who think it represented significant change.231  
As the OCC recognized in its recounting of why these rules were 
necessary, there was variation amongst the states and courts in how they 
approached the doctrines.232  In function, this solution would embrace 
that variability which the OCC saw as so problematic.233  This could be 
quite worrisome to industries whose entire business models depend on 
their newly assumed loan’s interest rate being valid when it was made 
along with wanting the originating bank to be the loan’s true lender.234  
At its core, this solution would re-vest the states and courts with their 
power to inquire into these specifics while returning to the assumption of 
the Valid When Made doctrine’s legitimacy.  
The reason why this solution may be less tenable resides in the 
fact that it would meet strong opposition from those who celebrated the 
Madden-fix, including the OCC.235  As the OCC assumed the role of 
providing the clarity it believed the market needed, it will likely take 
action from the new Biden administration and a new Comptroller of the 
 
Bank. In other words, the loan is not valid when made, but attempts to raise a usury defense 
are estopped as against a national bank.”). 
229. See Horn & Hall, supra note 24, at 2 (claiming that the Second Circuit in Madden 
“misplaced” its focus and thus came to a holding that will be limited in its impact). 
230. See id. (“[N]otwithstanding the Madden decision, the valid-when-made doctrine 
should remain alive and well.”). 
231. See Honigsberg, Jackson Jr. & Squire, supra note 59, at 36 (concluding that Madden 
did have an impact on the lending practices and credit-availability for consumers within the 
2d. Cir. Ct. of Appeals). 
232. See generally National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders,  85 Fed. 
Reg. 68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (claiming that the OCC’s True 
Lender rule is “necessary” to help banks partner “confidently” with marketplace lenders and 
insinuating that such confidence was not possible under the varied approaches used by states). 
233. See id. at 68742 (claiming that there is often “uncertainty” amongst banks and 
marketplace lenders who seek to determine the True Lender on a loan); see also Permissible 
Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 85 Fed. Reg. 33,530 
(June 2, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160) (repeating that this Valid When 
Made rule is intended to introduce “certainty” into the marketplace lending arrangements of 
the present and future). 
234. See supra Part II.B. 
235. See Cumming et al., supra note 43 (showing an example of support for the Madden-
fix rules). 
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Currency236 to make this solution possible.  Specifically, the Trump 
administration repeatedly evinced a desire to promote deregulation 
amongst federal agencies.237  Some have observed that the Madden-fix 
rules are an extension of this goal.238  It is unlikely that the OCC would 
reintroduce a new regulation, especially when considered alongside 
President Trump’s executive directives.239  With the victory of Joseph 
Biden in the 2020 presidential election,240 it is possible that the new 
administration could reverse these rules by either implementing their own 
or revoking them altogether.  Should the CRA fail to affect these rules, 
then this solution’s only real hope would reside with a new administration 
or the courts.241  
B.         Revise the Madden-Fix Rules to Preclude Predatory Lending 
If the OCC is willing to consider the negative potential that its 
Madden-fix could have, then a solution could be as simple as revisiting 
the rules and providing actual clarity to its position on predatory lenders.  
In such a scenario, the OCC would do well to consider a joint rulemaking 
 
236. Comptroller of the Currency; Appointment, 12 U.S.C. § 2 (1935) (offering the 
description of how one is appointed by the President to be Comptroller of the Currency). 
237. See Keith Belton & John Graham, Deregulation Under Trump, CATO INST. at 14 (June 
2020), https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2020-06/regulation-v43n2-5.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2JU6-323U] (“Donald Trump seems determined to go down in history as a 
deregulator.”). 
238. See, e.g., Levitin: Trump Administration and Subprime Lenders, supra note 8 (calling 
the Madden-fix rules the “ultimate DC swamp move.”). 
239. See Exec. Order No. 13771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (2017) (requiring agencies to identify 
two rules for removal for every new rule created). 
240. See Michael R. Blood & Nicholas Riccardi, Biden Officially Secures Enough Electors 
to Become President, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 4, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/election-
2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-elections-electoral-college-
3e0b852c3cfadf853b08aecbfc3569fa [https://perma.cc/5474-2833] (stating that Joseph R. 
Biden has secured enough electoral votes to become the 46th President of the United States). 
241. Challenges to the Madden-fix in court will likely prove to move slowly and take a 
long time. Indeed, the new rules are already being employed in cases such as one in Colorado. 
See Clem, supra note 182. Additionally, some commentators have observed that the Madden-
fix could still be overturned by the courts in what is known as the “Chevron-doctrine.” See 
Pratin Vallabhaneni, et al., OCC Finalizes Madden-Fix Rule; New Acting Comptroller Lays 
Out Priorities, WHITE & CASE (June 5, 2020), 
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/occ-finalizes-madden-fix-rule-new-acting-
comptroller-lays-out-priorities [https://perma.cc/AE64-2VLX]  (“The [Madden-fix] rule does 
not directly overturn Madden and, as a result, its significance may ultimately turn on how 
much deference courts are willing to give to agency interpretation of federal law under the 
Chevron doctrine.”); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Defense Council 467 U.S. 
837 (1984). 
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alongside the FDIC who is facing similar criticism with its rule.242  The 
major issues with these rules relate to their broad umbrella of protection 
to all types of lenders.243  Aside from those who flatly disagree with the 
OCC’s perceived need for clarity post-Madden,244 it is hard to ignore the 
benefits that these rules can have for legitimate businesses such as 
Midland Funding, LLC and their debt-purchasing operations.245  This 
solution suggests the OCC should embrace these positives while working 
to eliminate the rule’s downsides.246  
In its rulemaking process, the OCC recognized the various 
approaches by states, especially with the True Lender doctrine.247  The 
notice of proposed rulemaking itself even listed many of the factors 
which courts across the country consider and the various identifiers for 
which they might look.248  The perplexing quality about these rules is that 
the OCC recognized and then proceeded to disregard this traditional 
deference to state authorities, all for the sake of “clarity.”249  
A possible alternative would be to incorporate these categories 
and factors into the True Lender rule itself.250  There are several key 
factors that practically all courts appear to use with some degree of 
variability.251  These common factors in their simplest forms are: (1) the 
substance of the agreement in light of the totality of the circumstances; 
(2) the incentives of the involved parties to make or assume the loan; and 
 
242.  See, e.g., State of California v. FDIC, No. 4:20-cv-05860 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 20, 2020) 
(showing a similar bout of opposition to the FDIC’s Madden-fix from many of the same 
Attorneys General who oppose the OCC’s Madden-fix). 
243. See, e.g., Levitin: Trump Administration and Subprime Lenders, supra note 8 (arguing 
that the OCC’s post-Madden rulemaking will give rise to predatory lending). 
244. See, e.g., Levitin: Predatory Lending, supra note 8 (claiming that the Valid When 
Made doctrine is based upon a “misreading” of case law and therefore is not what some 
believe it to be). 
245. See supra Part IV.B. 
246. See supra Part IV.C. 
247. See National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg. 68,742 
(Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (tracing the variety of factors that were 
common across the True Lender doctrine). 
248. See National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders,  85 Fed. Reg. 
44,224 (proposed July 22, 2020) (offering caselaw examples of True Lender inquiries). 
249. See National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg. 68,745 
(Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (“This approach will provide additional 
clarity . . . .”). 
250. The OCC even recognizes a variety of factors and inquiries that underly the True 
Lender doctrine. National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders,  85 Fed. Reg. 
44,224 (proposed July 22, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (listing some of the most 
common approaches to True Lender inquiries). 
251. See id. (stating major examples of the True Lender inquiry in action in different states 
and courts). 
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(3) who holds the predominant economic interest in the loan.252  
Regardless of the specific forms they take, these three elements 
summarize the inquiries that even the OCC recognized as generally 
used.253  By allowing the states some leeway in looking beyond the mere 
form of the origination of the loan, the OCC can alleviate both the 
federalism254 and practicality concerns255 of its Madden-fix.  Virtually all 
states rely on some version of the True Lender doctrine.256  Thus, if the 
OCC believes that clarity in the market is necessary then it should not do 
so at the expense of a state’s ability to protect its consumers.257  
The other piece which this solution would entail is a narrow-
tailoring or creation of an exception on the OCC’s stance on the Valid 
When Made doctrine.  This change is envisioned as a complement to the 
proposed True Lender changes.258  Here, the OCC could probably not rely 
on a predefined prohibition on certain categories of lending, as predatory 
lenders can easily shift their approaches.259  Instead, the OCC might 
consider an addition to the rule which allows it to punish banks that are 
found to be repeatedly engaged in selling loans to predatory lenders.  
While many other consumer protection laws exist,260 this added penalty 
could preserve the Valid When Made doctrine for those marketplace 
lenders who legitimately rely upon it and disincentivize those who seek 
to take advantage of it.  
 
252. See id. (dictating the factors which the OCC identified as common across the True 
Lender doctrine). 
253. See id.(showing that even the OCC recognized that there were typical True Lender 
doctrine approache(s)/factors prior to and after Madden). 
254. See California v. OCC, No. 4:20-cv-05200 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2020) (“This case is 
about federal overreach.”). 
255. See supra Part IV.  
256. See Gilmer, supra note 16 (observing the utilization of the True Lender doctrine in 
litigation across multiple states). 
257. See Baiamonte, supra note 138, at 153 (concluding that “Allowing third-parties who 
purchase bank notes to benefit from the NBA . . . preemption of state usury laws is legally 
incorrect and harmful to consumers.”). 
258. The OCC’s issuance of a follow-up rule to its Valid When Made decision highlights 
how these two doctrines work in tandem. Because of this fact, any Madden solution must 
consider both doctrines and their interplay. See National Banks and Federal Savings 
Associations as Lenders,  85 Fed. Reg. 68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 
7); see also Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 
85 Fed. Reg. 33,530-36 (June 2, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160). 
259. See Munger, supra note 122, at 468 (examining all the ways that predatory lenders 
have shifted to usurp state laws and authorities). 
260. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1950) (“The 
Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or 
corporations. . . from using unfair methods of competition . . . and unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices. . . .”). 
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While offering the potential to disincentivize relationships with 
predatory lenders, this solution would ultimately face a tough battle.  As 
it currently operates, the OCC does not occupy an enforcement role 
against banks in the realm of secondary lending markets.261  Although 
creating a system of punishment for banks that engage in such 
arrangements may prevent or dissuade future actions by, giving the OCC 
penal powers to levy upon them would be a drastic increase of their 
abilities under the NBA.262  Furthermore, entities such as the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) currently operate within this 
general role of consumer protection and penalization.263  Creating a 
system which allows the OCC similar powers would likely create 
interagency tensions, as well as a potential for a violation of the non-
delegation of adjudicatory or legislative powers depending on the form it 
takes.264  While the OCC and FDIC warn of the “reputational” risks that 
Rent-A-Charter or other predatory lending relationships can have for 
banks,265 they should also recognize that the few banks that engage in 
 
261. In the OCC’s own words, their role as an “independent branch of the U.S. Department 
of the Treasury” involves chartering, regulating, and supervising all national banks. To 
accomplish this, the OCC lists its various tasks, all of which involve monitoring of nationally 
chartered banks. The closest apparent role to a penalization is in their ability to issue 
“corrective orders,” a common practice amongst agencies. According to the OCC, these 
“corrective orders” are reserved for “necessary” instances in which OCC-governed banks do 
not comply with laws and regulations. Most the OCC’s daily tasks involve oversight and 
advisement, not penalization. See About Us—What We Do, OCC (2020) 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/ [https://perma.cc/3RVG-6DYW]. But see News Release 2020-
132, OCC Assesses $400 Million Civil Money Penalty Against Citibank, OCC (Oct. 7, 2020) 
https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2020/nr-occ-2020-132.html 
[https://perma.cc/6XAU-6UQW] (offering an example of an OCC penalty for a bank violating 
a law, in this case, regarding cybersecurity and data protection). 
262. See Enforcement Actions, OCC (2020) https://occ.treas.gov/topics/laws-and-
regulations/enforcement-actions/index-enforcement-actions.html [https://perma.cc/FHE9-
ZM4U] (outlining the OCC’s enforcement tools and providing a search function to review its 
past enforcement actions). 
263. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5491 
(2010) (establishing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and granting its scope of 
enforcement and supervisory powers). 
264. While non-delegation of adjudicatory powers is not here examined beyond conjecture, 
the leading case for any such challenge is CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). Similarly, the 
leading case for non-delegation of legislative powers is Whitman v. Am’ Trucking Ass’n, Inc., 
531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
265. See National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders,  85 Fed. Reg. 
68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (“The OCC agrees that rent-a-charter 
schemes have no place in the federal financial system . . . .”); see also Permissible Interest on 
Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 85 Fed. Reg. 33,530-36 (June 2, 
2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160) (“[The OCC] has consistently opposed 
predatory lending, including through relationships between banks and third parties.”); see also 
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such behavior choose to continue to do so in spite of these risks.266  
Something more than an indeterminate warning is necessary to stop them. 
This solution also falls short due to its inability to provide 
consumers any relief from predatory lending relationships, something 
which many of the pre-Madden approaches did.267   While it could 
penalize banks and lenders, dissuading them from entering future 
predatory lending relationships, this option offers nothing to help those 
consumers currently stuck in them.  Instead, the best approach would be 
for the OCC to combine these two solutions to create a lending “safe 
harbor”—offering accountability for banks while also returning methods 
of redress into the hands of the consumer.  
C. The Preferred Solution—Creating a “Safe Harbor” for Banks to 
Take Loan Accountability While Offering Consumers Redress 
From Predatory Lenders 
The two previous solutions have strong potential but come with 
some glaring flaws.  A return to the pre-Madden days is likely to be flatly 
opposed by the OCC and those who celebrated the rules.268  Similarly, 
the enactment of a system of punishment for banks that engage with 
predatory lenders may sound straightforward, but would actually be a 
dramatic change from the OCC’s current enforcement model of 
advisement over punishment.269  At the core of both of these solutions is 
the fact that the Madden-fix rules are heavily skewed towards form over 
function.270  To create a functional model that protects consumers and 
offers them tools for redress against predatory lenders, the OCC should 
 
See Federal Interest Rate Authority, 85 Fed. Reg. 44,153 (July 22, 2020) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 331) (discussing the FDIC responses to commentators who feared its rule would 
facilitate predatory lending). 
266. See Letter from the Ctr. for Responsible Lending et al., to Congress (Sept. 20, 2017) 
https://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/research-publication/crl-
support-protectingconsumers-unreasonablerates-sep2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4US-
YFMN] (noting the very real and damaging actions of predatory lenders and partnerships with 
banks and how they impact American consumers). 
267. See Hannon, supra note 89, at 1273-74 (citing Cuomo v. Clearing House Assoc., 557 
U.S. 519, 536 (2009) (discussing the Supreme Court’s approaches and interpretations of OCC 
rules that sought to limit state consumer protection laws). 
268. See, e.g., Cumming et al., supra note 43 (showing that there were commentators who 
were pleased with the Madden-fix rules and celebrated their potential to bring certainty and 
clarity to the lending market). 
269. Enforcement Actions, supra note 262. 
270. See Wilmarth “True Lender” Comment Letter, supra note 192 (arguing that the 
Madden-fix True Lender rule will give too much of a shield to predatory lenders who would 
seek to exploit it). 
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consider returning the Valid When Made doctrine to its pre-Madden form 
while attempting to codify the True Lender doctrine.271 
This solution operates in two parts.  It (1) embraces the argument 
that Madden did not question the Valid When Made doctrine;272 and (2) 
agrees that the True Lender doctrine did, as the OCC stated, need 
clarity.273  Together, these two understandings would allow the OCC to 
offer predictability and certainty to the lenders and businesses it sought 
to nurture while also giving consumers the protection they need. 
The first consideration of this solution echoes the concerns that 
many observers of the lending market post-Madden felt: the case itself 
had very little impact on the lending market and practically no impact on 
the Valid When Made doctrine.274  Indeed, Madden never addressed or 
mentioned the doctrine by name.275  The Second Circuit even appeared 
to misinterpret the NBA’s choice of state usury laws as it failed to account 
for the Valid When Made doctrine.276  By accepting the premise that 
Madden was terminally flawed, and should be limited in its holding, the 
OCC would allow the Valid When Made doctrine to return to its status 
pre-Madden.277  However, legitimate marketplace lenders need not 
worry.  The operation of the NBA and Section 1831d’s interest rate 
choice of law—along with the pre-Madden Valid When Made doctrine 
and this proposed True Lender doctrine—would help identify and 
eliminate predatory lending arrangements while preserving their 
legitimate loan relationships.  
 
271. While the current True Lender final rule did arguable codify the doctrine, this Note 
argues that the current method focuses too much on form over function and that the OCC 
should revise it accordingly. See supra Part IV.C.  
272. See Horn & Hall, supra note 24, at 22–23 (discussing the ways that lenders have 
restructured their practices to retain the benefit Valid When Made doctrine in the Second 
Circuit post-Madden). 
273. See National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders,  85 Fed. Reg. 
68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (claiming that clarity in the lending 
market and with marketplace lender arrangements was necessary and led to the promulgation 
of the True Lender doctrine rule). 
274. See Horn & Hall, supra note 24, at 22–25 (outlining the potential changes to the 
lending market post-Madden and stating that doctrines such as the Valid When Made, should 
remain relatively unaffected). 
275. See id. at 1 (noting that the Second Circuit apparently ignored the existence of the 
Valid When Made doctrine). 
276. See id. at 21 (noting that the Solicitor General and the OCC both petitioned the 
Supreme Court for certiorari in Madden, with both pointing to the 2nd Circuit’s failure to 
account for the Valid When Made doctrine). 
277. See Franson, supra note 104, at 46–47 (noting the argument proffered by the U.S. 
Solicitor General in the petition for certiorari post-Madden, in which it was claimed that the 
Valid When Made doctrine was effectively already codified in the NBA and that the Madden 
court undermined it).  
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The second facet of this solution will require more creativity on 
the part of the OCC.  While the proposed rule about the True Lender 
doctrine did arguably codify it, the current form leaves consumers 
exposed and without protection.278  Instead, the OCC should seek to 
create a much more functional system where banks may take some form 
of accountability and risk for the loans that they originate.  In short, the 
OCC should create a “Safe Harbor” for banks in the form of a holding 
period for loans that, if satisfied, would preclude a finding that another 
entity is the true lender in a particular relationship. 
A suggested concept could mimic the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) holding period for determining whether someone 
is actually taking on an investment risk themselves or is simply acting as 
an intermediary for the true purchaser.279  This rule by the SEC dictates a 
set period during which the holder of the security must take on the risk of 
a private placement investment prior to divestment.280  The OCC could 
easily create a similar system or risk-period in which banks assume the 
risk of all of their loans much like the holder of an investment security 
interest does with the SEC.281  In tandem with this holding period, states 
could maintain their various approaches to inquiring into a loan’s true 
lender.282 
While transferring a loan before the holding period had been 
completed would not automatically result in a lending relationship being 
deemed “predatory,” it could be an indicator in the factors that courts 
traditionally use to investigate.283  Furthermore, this safe harbor solution 
would allow a loan that is held by a bank for the pre-determined amount 
 
278. See Levitin: Trump Administration and Subprime Lenders, supra note 8 (“The Trump 
administration’s [OCC] proposal would allow payday lenders to make loans in every state 
without regard to state usury laws (or state licensing requirements and thus enforcement of 
other state consumer protection laws)…just as long as those lenders partner with a bank.”). 
279. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1972) (showcasing the SEC’s holding period statute which 
the OCC could seek to mimic). 
280. See id. (outlining how the investment holding period operates with the SEC). 
281. No specific timeframe or holding-window is suggested here. The goal of this option 
is to create accountability for banks and the loans that they issue, not to tie up capital and 
restrain their lending practices. See Hannon, supra note 89, at 1288 (2018) (“Quite intuitively, 
the longer and more substantive the role of the bank in the rent-a-charter arrangement, the 
more likely it is that the bank’s regulators will effectively detect and deter abusive or unsafe 
practices and encourage or mandate conformance with fundamental principles of safety and 
soundness and consumer protection.”). 
282. For a thorough discussion on the history and development of the True Lender doctrine, 
see John Hannon’s comprehensive overview, id. at 1280–84. 
283. To see a discussion of the pre-Madden-fix True Lender doctrine in action, along with 
some of the aforementioned factors subtly being applied, see Franson, supra note 104, at 1–3 
(discussing True Lender litigation in Colorado in 2018 and showcasing how courts often look 
beyond the mere fact of who funds the loan when determining its “true lender”). 
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of time, to be protected from a finding of the bank not being the true 
lender in the relationship.284  If a bank were to decline the set holding 
period and still offload the loan to a predatory lender then consumers 
would be protected by this backstop, allowing them an avenue of redress 
for potential harms caused by any predatory relationships.285  In effect, 
this system would act as a two-part filter, aimed at catching and 
dissuading predatory lenders while also providing legitimate institutions 
a predictable and uniform system.286  States could retain their varying 
factors of consideration, with this being one potential indicator, and the 
OCC could ensure more predictability.287  
Instead of taking on a punitive role via the prior suggestion,288 
this solution would allow the OCC to retain its observational and advisory 
position.289  This would let courts and consumers have some methods of 
relief from predatory lending relationships while also creating a 
predictable system for banks and lenders.  Contrasted with an approach 
to the True Lender doctrine which refuses to look any deeper than who is 
 
284. As some commentators  have observed, the SEC’s holding period for certain securities 
is being expanded to new markets such as blockchain and cryptocurrency. See What to Expect 
in 2020, MANATT FINTECH (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/manatt-
fintech-what-to-expect-in-2020-54942/ [https://perma.cc/5TKK-K6JY] (exploring the 
process of the SEC securities holding period as applied to “tokens and other items of value.”). 
Much as the SEC does for securities it determines to be held for noninvestment intent, the 
OCC could easily replicate this practice for bank loans. See 12 C.F.R. § 34.82 (2019) 
(showcasing an example of a holding period which the OCC already mandates for banks, here 
concerning the holding of “Other Real Estate Owned” (OREO)).  
285. See Munger, supra note 122, at 500 (providing another potential solution for 
expanding consumer protection and enhancing state laws via three elements). 
286. As one of its main reasons for its Madden-fix rules, the OCC cited “recent 
developments” (i.e., Madden) as the need to provide clarity to lenders and the market. 
However, much of the criticism of the Madden-fix rules claim that the OCC’s approach was 
much too broad and left states powerless to enforce their usury laws. See National Banks and 
Federal Savings Associations as Lenders,  85 Fed. Reg. 68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified 
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7); see also Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or 
Otherwise Transferred, 85 Fed. Reg. 33,530–36 (June 2, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 
pts. 7 and 160); but see NCLC Press Release, supra note 26 (arguing that the OCC’s Madden-
fix will strip state usury laws of their efficacy and power). 
287. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 23 (criticizing the OCC for stripping states of their 
ability to examine suspect lending relationships via “multifactor tests”); see also National 
Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders,  85 Fed. Reg. 68,743 (Oct. 30, 2020), 
(stating that the OCC believes that a “simple” test is necessary to create predictability with 
the True Lender doctrine). 
288. See supra Part V.B. 
289. See About Us—What We Do, OCC (2020) https://www.occ.treas.gov/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/3RVG-6DYW] (noting that the OCC largely operates to supervise the banks 
and institutions that fall within its purview). 
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named on or originates the loan,290 this approach begins with a consistent 
pattern of the bank holding and taking on the risk of its loans.  This would 
not only disincentivize banks from making risky loans but would also 
make it harder for predatory lenders to utilize the quick offloading of 
loans on which they typically rely.291  Unlike a reassurance that a “robust 
system of oversight”292 will catch future predatory lending, this solution 
would offer a tangible metric for banks, marketplace lenders, and 
consumers to have some much needed certainty. 
Together, this solution would be the strongest approach for the 
OCC to consider.  Allowing states and courts to regain some of their tools 
of consumer protectionism while simultaneously creating a uniform and 
predictable pattern within the lending market would achieve all the 
OCC’s stated Madden-fix goals.293  Furthermore, the OCC cited the need 
for consistency as its major basis for promulgating both rules.294  This 
proposal offers that consistency while also allowing for a functional 
method of rooting out predatory lenders. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In responding to Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, the OCC 
believed that it was providing much needed clarity to the lending 
market.295  In crafting its Madden-fix, the OCC sought input and feedback 
in its typical fashion, but the final products were underwhelming and non-
responsive to many of the concerns.296  The current Madden-fix rules lack 
 
290. See National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders,  85 Fed. Reg. 
68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (claiming that a bank will be the 
True Lender on a loan if it is either named on it or funds the loan). 
291. See Hannon, supra note 89, at 1264–65 (outlining the normal process of a predatory 
“Rent-A-Charter” lending relationship). 
292. See National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders,  85 Fed. Reg. 
68,743 (Oct. 30, 2020) (“This test will provide legal certainty, and the OCC’s robust 
supervisory framework effectively targets predatory lending, achieving the same goal as a 
more complex [T]rue [L]ender test.”). 
293. Supra Part IV.B. 
294. National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders,  85 Fed. Reg. 68,742 
(Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7); see also Permissible Interest on Loans That 
Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 85 Fed. Reg. 33,530–36 (June 2, 2020) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160). 
295. See generally National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders,  85 Fed. 
Reg. 68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7); see also Permissible Interest 
on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 85 Fed. Reg. 33,530–36 (June 
2, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 160). 
296. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1966) (offering the Administrative Procedure Act’s outline for 
agencies engaging in rulemaking procedures); see also Wilmarth “True Lender” Comment 
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sufficient guideposts to prevent predatory lending; instead, they seem to 
invite it.  While they do provide several benefits to legitimate marketplace 
lenders, the risk of harm to consumers is much greater if the rules are left 
as is.  The OCC should strongly consider creating a system of 
accountability for banks and their loans while also allowing their interest 
rates to remain valid when transferred to legitimate secondary lenders.  
Without such changes, consumers will be at an increased risk of 
becoming victims of predatory lending, the likes of which have been 
curtailed for well over a decade.297  





Letter, supra note 192, at 19 (showing many claims as to why the OCC Madden-fix is 
problematic and potentially impermissible). 
297. See Gilmer, supra note 16 (mapping the rise in prevalence and efficacy of True Lender 
litigation in protecting consumers). 
*I would like to thank the entire staff of the North Carolina Banking Institute Journal and its 
editorial board, including Professor Lissa L. Broome, Thomas Walls, and Ricky Willi. I would 
also like to give special thanks to my editors, Katherine Franck and Lauren Davis, as well as 
to Mr. Glenn E. Morrical. Their insight and advice proved invaluable throughout this process. 
Finally, I would like to thank my family and my fiancée for supporting me as I undertook this 
journey.   
